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To THE OFFICERS AND MEN oF THE 68TH TANK BATTALION: 
This is a history of an organization which did a great deal of hard effective 
fighting, of a unit which received little credit, but which was truly one of the 
"work horses" of the western front. It is a history which each of you helped 
to write- and one in which you can take deep pride. It is a history made 
possible by your skill, courage, stamina and determination. And it is a history 
written in blood, the blood of those of us who failed to return. To them, it is 
therefore dedicated. 
It was my honor to command the Battalion during much of the time in which 
this history was made. Of that, I am very proud. 
In your future life, I hope that each of you, individually may attain every 
happiness. And may your individual efforts be as successful as those you made 
as a unit. To you and yours, the best of luck. 
Sincerely, 
LT. COL. INF. 

UNIT HISTORY OF THE 68TH TANK BATTALION 
This will be the record of the 68th Tank Battalion's participation in successive 
campaigns from the historic breakthrough in Normandy to "VE" Day in the heart 
of Germany. Before beginning this narrative, however, there are some remarks we 
must make. Firstly, this his,tory was made possible by the heroically spent blood 
and sweat of American men, who gave their best for their country. They did 
well, these men, and though some of them are no longer with us, their deeds will 
never be forgotten. Some were singled out and cited for their gallantry and heroism, 
they cannot be praised too highly. Then there were those who were not con-
spicuously recognized, but who, day in and day out, week in week out, month in 
month out performed steadily and efficiently, these men under the leadership of 
their Battalion Commander, Lt. Colonel Harold C. Davall, and his Officers and 
non-commissioned Officers, are the unsung heroes who made this writing possible. 
The word "Defeat" never had any meaning for them, unless it were inflicted on 
their enemy. So, although five campaign stars or this story cannot tell all that they 
accomplished, we hope that this will help recall, in part at least, why we are 
proud to have been members of the 68th Tank Battalion. 
Lt. Robert J. Burns, Jr., Linguist, recon 
platoon leader S-2 and good man to have 
around. Co-author of this history. 
(_; 
Lt. John S. Dahl, formerly 1st Sgt. of 
"Charlie"' Co. and commissioned on the bat-
tlefield. Co-author of this history. 
View of Utah Beach w ith landing craft the day we landed. 
Photo by Moustache. 
The 68th Tank Battalion had been well trained in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. It had studied, maneuvered, and exercised long and as-
siduously for the grim business of war. Commanders knew their men ; the men 
knew their jobs-all this from training and the book. But, suddenly the chips 
were down. We had just recently crossed the channel from England, and had 
regained our land legs. We were ready. We were alerted; we wondered what 
sort of a job was in store for us. Preparations were being quietly made, and 
we all felt that something big was up to break through that stalemate down 
by St. Lo and Lessay. And then, surely enough it began. 
On July 28, 1944, at 1115, under Combat Command "A," we moved out 
from the vicinity of Fierville toward Lessay. Company "A," commanded by 
Captain Raymond Polk, was attached to the combat command advance guard 
under the 44th Armored Infantry Battalion. Then after un-eventfully and suc-
cessfully passing through the 79th Infantry Division at Lessay, the Battalion 
The rubble which was left of Lessay after our Bombers 
and artillery had pounded it. Photo by Moustache. 
bivouacked in the vicinity of Montsurvent. Thus the first day was over, and 
the big move had begun, but the world had no inkling that the breakthrough 
was under way. At 1040 the following day, the battalion moved out of its 
bivouac area toward Pont de la Toque, when resistance was met by the head 
of the column at Pont de la Roque, we moved off the road into 'a temporary 
assembly and remained there until 2115, while the attack on the river crossing 
developed. When the combat command deployed for the attack, one platoon 
of Company "A," under the command of 2nd Lt. Donald A. Kratzer, was order-
ed to take up direct fire positions on the high ground north of the Seine River, 
and this fire was delivered on predesignated targets with excellent observed re-
sults. Then, after the attack by the 44th was successful, this same platoon 
forded the river under very difficult conditions and went into positions to sup-
port the Infantry in case of counter-attack. At 2115, the Battalion moved into 
bivouac one mile north of Pont de la Roque, and remained there for the night. 
, On the 30th of July, still under "CCA," we went into Division reserve, while 
·dements of "CCB" passed through early in the morning. Then, at 2115, the 
·battalion moved out again, and marched until dawn, at which time it closed 
bivouac near Munevjlle-Sur-Mer, where a successful operation was marred by 
the death of Pvt. William \Vall, "A" Company, who was killed by a booby trap. 
Although our lightning strike up to this point had been veiled with secrecy, 
evervone knew that the outfit had broken into the clear, and from here on in it 
would be a question of stamina and some plain and fancy broken field running. 
After only a few hours rest, the battalion moved out again and closed bivoc1ac 
near La .Tapiniere at 1415. Still driving hard and fast, we moved out again 
at 1900 and reached a point near Sartilly at 0315 the next morning. We were 
then under the control of the Third Army, destined to later and even soon 
cover itself with glory and also its colorful leader, Lt. General George Patton, Jr. 
Early in the afternoon of the first of August, we headed for Avranches. 
After moving out we were strafed by enemy planes, and suffered one casualty. 
It was our first experience with strafing planes, · and . we shot at them perhaps 
a little indiscriminately. Perhaps the trigger finger was a little itchy. At 1930, 
the column was strafed again, this time south of Avranches, but we suffered 
no casualties. Then, we closed in bivouac shortly before midnight north of 
Antrain. The battalion S-2, Captain Raines, went forward to contact the FFI 
for information and found that they had cleared the town of enemy, and had 
seized and held an important bridge there, vitally necessary for the continued 
advance of the combat command. Our Reconnaissance Platoon, commanded 
by Lt. Harry Linebaugh in the meanwhile had reconnoitered for additional cross-
ing of the river to be used in the event the bridge was blown. So ended an-
other day, and we were really starting to roll. 
At 0720 the next morning we continued the march, and swiftly steamed 
to a point near Medreac. Although we sidestepped most of it, we encountered 
scattered resistance, and captured during the day twelve prisoners, including 
one each badly confused Major. Also, "D" Company was strafed at 1410 by 
enemy planes firing rockets, but their accuracy was nil, and they were suc-
cessfully driven off without any harm being done. The weather was ideal now, 
and, in spite of the strain of continual driving, we were in fine fettle and full 
of confidence. "CCB" was paralleling our spearhead and the enemy was in con-
fused rout, that is, what remained of him, for we were well within his outer 
shell by this time. On the third of August, we moved out at 1225. Company 
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"A," marching with advance guard, had been ·r eceiving continuous small arms 
fire, but Captain Polk had found it necessary to use only limited deployment 
to clear the route of march. However, upon entering Mauron, one platoon, as 
part of the advance party encountered stiff small arms and cannon fire. So, 
with this platoon acting as a base of fire, the remainder of the company enveloped 
the town from the north. During this action, they destroyed several machine 
gun nests and caused heavy enemy casualties. As a result of this attack, what 
was left of this kraut force fell back from the town. And here's an interesting 
note-for the first time we found that 
quite a few of the heinies were wear-
ing Red Cross arm bands. Was 
Jerry getting a little desperate- may-
be? Well, when this action was 
completed, the battalion moved into 
bivouac one mile south of Mauron 
at 2200. At this time, one platoon, 
the second, of Company "D" was 
assigned to "CCA" trains for rear 
guard protection. Our supply lines 
were stretching a wee bit. 
At eight o'clock the next morn-
ing, the battalion was detached from 
"CCA," as also was the 44th AlB. 
Col. Davall was placed in command 
of this newly formed force, and 
was ordered to remain in the area 
and await further orders, and was 
also assigned Battery "A" of the 
777th AAA Bn, but then at noon, 
we reverted to "CCA" control again. 
Then Col. Davall was given the 
charge of leading the combat com-
mand column, at 1350 we pulled 
out, heading west. At Pontivy, the 
column ran into a blown bridge; there 
Sergeant Malcolm Helton, later deco-
rated with a Bronze Star for his 
action, reconnoitered and found an 
alternate route across the river and 
canal, which permitted the force to 
proceed with minimum loss of time. 
In order to accomplish this, Sgt. Hel-
ton penetrated twenty miles, re-
portedly, into an area held by the 
enemy, and used only one section 
to perform his hazardous mission. 
With the column now in "free 
wheeling" we knifed our way sixty-
one miles beyond Mauron, where 
opposition was swiftly dealt with, the 
task force refueled and remained 
along side the road to grab forty 
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S j Sgt. Malcom Helton-The Reconnais-
sance Platoon Sgt. who performed his every 
task in an outstanding manner. 
winks. Thus ended one of the most daring, brilliantly led, under pressure armored 
stabs made thus far in the march. 
At nine thirty on the fifth of August, CCA resumed its westward trek under 
the command of Brig. General James Taylor. Then east of Merdrignac, Company 
"C" was fired on by organized sniper fire from a trench system. , The company 
immediately returned fire, killing five enemy, and wounded many others. When 
the head of the column reached Huelgoat, Lt. Col. McCorrison was ordered by 
the Division Commander to clear the town, and two platoons of Company "A" 
were ordered to support one company of the 44th in accomplishing this mission. 
This force closed on the enemy in two directions and drove them into the north-
ern end of the town. At this point, resistance grew very stiff, and the task force 
came to grips with the enemy at close quarters. One tank was hit by Panzer-
faust fire at a very close range, and was set on fire. However, the tank crew 
remained inside and continued to machine gun the krauts until the heat became 
unbearable; crawling out of the vehicle they found themselves su;rrounded by 
Wehrmacht troops who called to them to surrender. Unanimously they refused, 
and immediately opened fire on the group in the face of overwhelming odds, 
and almost certain death. Technician 5th Grade, Santo De Nunziato, Fred K. 
Blaylock, were cut down by machine gun fire. Nunziato was immediately 
killed and Blaylock died of wounds later in the hospital. Technician 4th Grade 
Charles E. Pidcock continued to fire his sub-machine gun at close range until 
his tank exploded, and threw him into a nearby hedgerow. The enemy had been 
dissipated; all three tankers were later awarded the Silver Star for their gallantry 
in action. After the above action the column passed through the town of Huel-
goat and bypassed the fighting. Company C commanded by Captain Daniel 
E. Smith was ordered to relieve Company A as part of the advance Guard. The 
actual transfer, however, did not take place until next morning, and that night 
enemy patrols infiltrated through a company bivouac area in the forward area, 
throwing grenades and causing one casualty before being driven off. 
Then on the 6th of August, the 1st Platoon of D Company was attached to 
the advance guard to support the point. Also the third platoon of this company 
was attached to advance guard with the mission of reconnoitering an enemy 
strong point on the flank of the column. The third platoon proceeded on an 
independent route and encountered a road block defended by small arms, ma-
chine guns and bazookas. The platoon drew very heavy fire from all weapons, 
deployed and withdrew under their own supporting fire after inflicting heavy 
casualties and driving off some of the enemy machine guns and bazookas. This 
action cost the Company an important casualty, Captain Robert B. McKenna, 
Company Commander of Company "D," who was wounded in the left arm. The 
first platoon in the point encountered small arms, bazookas, and mortar fire while 
reconnoitering an enemy strong point while in the vicinity of the route march, 
but received no casualties. The main body moved out of the Bivouac area at 
approximately 1745. 
Company C, now in the advance party, ran into stiff enemy resistance at 
Blouveaut, and came under fire from small arms, machine guns, mortars, and 
a battery of artillery. The enemy was dug in on well prepared positions. Enemy 
observation was good. However, a section of medium tanks, under the com-
mand of 2nd Lt. John Lundh, pushed into town and pressed the enemy back 
into the west end of town, while the CCA column bypassed the town and the 
strong point. This tank section knocked out two enemy machine gun nests and 
inflicted heavy personal casualties on the foe. It also admirably succeeded in 
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screening the main body on the south end of the town, but the cost was heavy. 
Both tanks of the section were knocked out. Lt. Lundh's tank was knocked out 
by direct fire from a captured enemy French 75, and Sgt. Capozi's tank was 
knocked out by bazooka fire. The casualties were two killed, one wounded, and 
4 missing. 
At 2050 south of Plauveaut, when enemy artillery began to shell CCA column, 
lst Lt. Elzie Hickerson went forward in an attempt to locate enemy guns and 
to direct our fire. In order to do this Lt. Hickerson had to go into the area 
where the fire was falling: this he did, and located the gun positions and re-
mained there directing our counter-battery fire which immediately silenced the 
guns. For this action, Lt. Hickerson, the assault gun platoon leader, was later 
awarded the Bronze Star Medal. Thus the enemy was once more driven into 
headlong retreat. The Battalion finally closed in bivouac at 0200 the following 
morning in the vicinity of Gouesnou. Thus completed a continuous thirty-two 
hour march, which took the column through the towns of Bodtis and Plabennec. 
Early in the morning of the 8th of August, the advance guard, to which 
was attached Company "C" and one platoon of Company "D ," was heavily 
shelled by enemy artillery, direct fire and heavy mortar fire. Our vehicles were 
immobilized because of lack of gasoline; our drive had gone so far and so fast that 
our supply lines were stretched almost to the breaking point. Jerry had excellent 
observation, and his gun batteries were perfectly camouflaged; his ground troops 
were well dug in. And, although liaison planes vainly attempted to spot the 
concealed positions, our counter-battery fire was ineffective, and the merciless 
pounding continued for four and a half hours without respite. 
During this action many acts of heroism were noted; for example: Captain 
Daniel E. Smith, Company Commander of Company "C" attempted to locate 
enemy installations, boldly stood on tank and hedgerow, and so exposed him-
self on countless occasions without concern for his personal safety. An Infantry 
attack was expected; we needed better observation. Sensing this Captain Smith 
maintained constant watch, paying no heed to the hail of shells bursting about 
him. For this heroic conduct, he was later awarded the Silver Star Medal. Also, 
Pfc. James T. Smith discovered that his buddy lay wounded in a slit trench; he 
climbed on top of the turret of his tank to find the first aid kit. A shell struck 
the turret and seriously wounded him. Despite his mortal wounds, he secured the 
kit and crawled to the aid of his fallen comrade. Then, after treating his buddy, 
he collapsed and was himself evacuated. several days later, he died in a field 
hospital. For his gallantry in action, he was posthumously awarded the Silver 
Star Medal. 
During this costly action, our 
reconnaissance had further ascer-
tained that we had run into outer 
defenses of fortress BREST. The 
Division objective loomed so near 
and yet so far. Our commanders 
followed the only logical course-
withdrawal to more advantageous 
positions, stabilize our line, and pre-
pare to attack this strategically im-
portant port. It should be noted here 
that the final reduction of Brest later 
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Moustache Hickerson and Cpl. Magnoni 
in their Forward Observers peep. 
proved to be a major military operation requiring the committment of a corps 
reinforced and lasting several weeks. And here we were- having nearly completed 
a two hundred and fifty mile piledriving breakthrough which had sapped our 
armored virility. The men were tired. Then from higher headquarters came the 
order to our Battalion "Attack and seize that portion of Brest which lies within 
your zone." 
Automatically plans were made and we prepared for what we thought would 
be a last, futilely suicidal, sacrificial dash to glory. 
As part of CCA, Task Force Davall was made up of the Battalion Recon-
naissance Platoon, Battalion Headquarters, three subordinate assault forces, each 
composed of three medium tanks, one F.O.'s tank, one platoon of armored infantry, 
one tank destroyer. The Infantry was mounted on the tanks and T. D. The task 
force also had a reserve under lst. Lt. Elzie Hickerson, which was composed of 
our l05mm Assault Gun Platoon, Mortar Platoon, the 44th AlB AT Platoon, 
and Engineer flame thrower souad, and an engineer mine detection squad. Re-
maining elements of the Battalion were also employed to form two other major 
Task Forces, similar in composition to Task Force Davall. One task force was 
under the command of Captain Raymond Polk, CO of Company "A." Also, 
the combat command reserve included Company "D" and service and adminis-
trative ele!;nents of the 68th. 
After a lengthy artillery preuaration, the attack iumped off at 0700 on the 
ninth of August. Task Force Qavall was fired on by well placed 20mm dual-
purpose ack-ack guns before it reached the line of departure. Our counter-
battery silenced these guns, we knew exactly where they were, for 2nd Lt. Harry 
Linebau,gh with elements of his platoon had reconnoitered, had even dangerously 
worked his wav right up to the very gun muzzles the night before, and had pin-
pointed their location. Lt. Linebaugh was later awarded the Bronze Star Medal 
for this feat. 
All Task Forces were working their way closer to the enemy's defensive 
position. Task Force Davall encountered a road block, and instantaneously began 
· to outflank it, when suddenly there came over the radio the order to halt the 
attack and to withdraw. Whew! That was close! We were not disappointed 
that the attack was called off for everyone knew how enormous was the task, 
how well prepared he was to greet us on land, sea and air. 
So, retaining the composition of task forces, and under the control of CCA, 
Task Force Davall marched to the vicinity of Plouvien. The Recon Platoon 
went forward and found the town clear of enemy; the column turned west just 
south of town and proceeded to its bivouac area, but before we had cleared this 
turning point, fighting broke out in the streets. We later found out that an 
enemy force of a bout 1500 members of the 265th lnfantrv Division had ap-
proached Plouvien from the Northeast, unaware that we were there. Captain 
Polk was Johnny-on-the-spot; he saw that the column's safe passage at this 
critical point was seriously menaced. So, quickly he took a section of his medium 
tanks into the town proper and contacted there a mixed group of 44th and 9th 
AlB doughs, but no accompanying Officers, so he immediately took command of 
the situation. He organized a tank-dough Task Force and drove through the 
town until fire from enemy mortars, artillery and machine gems became so severe 
that farther advance was impossible. In the meantime, Lt. Col. McCorrison, 
CO of the 44th AlB had arrived on the scene, and it was decided that Col Mc-
Corrison would press the attack in the original direction while Captain Polk 
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took a light Task Force around and whacked the krauts from the west. Captain 
Polk, having sent for an additional section of medium tanks, fought his way 
around through the west side of town and pushed in the enemy right flank. 
The kraut force, finding itself pinched in between the two attacking forces, 
withdrew from town and retreated up the road, at which point our fighter 
planes dove into view and worked them over. Needless to mention, for his 
display of courage and his initiative and aggressiveness Captain Polk was awarded 
the Silver Star. 
Also, during the above action, we must tell what the outstanding soldiers 
under Captain Polk achieved. Staff Sergeant Vernard T. Brock-Jones, and Ser-
geant Myron N. Switzer, Platoon Sergeant and Section Leader respectively of 
the section called up by Captain Polk to reinforce the original force, arrived on 
the scene with orders to join an Infantry Platoon on the west side of town. 
They found only two Infantrymen there, but immediately took enemy positions 
under fire and fought their way forward. Infantrymen arrived and they con-
tinued forward against heavy mortar, artillery and machine gun fire. S jSgt. 
Brock-Jones's tank was hit by bazooka fire, but he kept going and kept pouring 
lead into the jerries until they were either mowed down or flying out of town. 
Although un-hit, Sgt. Switzer did likewise, and so both of these leaders were later 
awarded the Silver Stars for their intrepid gallantry in the face of great odds. 
Then, after the smoke had cleared away and the battle was won, the 68th 
Tank Battalion went into bivouac for refueling and badly needed, much de-
served rest. We remained in that location through the twelfth of August, re-
cuperated and refitted as much as possible. 
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T }Sgt. Vito Del Moro-"Baker" Company 
Maintenance Sgt. who, with his crew, kept 
their vehicles in tiptop shape. 
With the famous break-through to Brest over, and the Battalion refreshed from 
the succeeding rest at Plouvien, Higher Headquarters didn't waste any time in 
picking another job for us. The Division was ordered to the vicinity of Lorient, 
which had been reached by the Fourth Armored Division almost abreast of us. 
We were to relieve them, and from what we had heard they needed it. Well, 
anyway we left Plouvien on the thirteenth of August, and headed toward 
Lorient. We arrived at Le Heles later in the day, and bivouacked there for the 
night. 
The Battalion Staff and Cpmpany Commanders left the Battalion area the 
next morning and went forward to reconnoiter the area held by the 8th Tk Bn., 
4th A.D., preparatory to relieving them. Then, at 1600 the battalion moved 
out of its bivouac area and closed in the vicinity of Arzano at two o'clock the 
following morning. 
Then, we were relieved from being attached to CCA, and were attached to 
CCB. Our mission was to contain Lorient, in support of the 44th Armored 
Infantry Battalion and elements of the 25th Armored Engineer Battalion. 
On the sixteenth of August, while the Battalion remained in bivouac near 
Arzano, Col. Davall, his S-2, Assault Gun Platoon Leader, Reconnaissance Pla-
toon, and one platoon of light tanks from "D" Company departed on a re-
connaissance in force to the east. The mission was to determine the number 
and disposition in the area generally between Vannes and Nantes and to sever 
the main road between those two cities. The patrol reached Vannes in the late 
afternoon, contacted elements of a French Paratroop Regiment and went into 
bivouac there for the night. The S-3 returned to Division with the information 
gained from the French, and rejoined the force before midnight. 
On the following day, while the battalion's status remained unchanged, the 
reconnaissance force continued on its mission. They found the bridge at La Roche 
Bernard blown, and they continued to the east generally along the axis of the 
River. When they reached Redon, only peeps could cross the flimsy bridge, 
so the rest of the force remained in assembly west of town. At Fegreac, element 
of the patrol drew small arms and machine ~un fire, and lost one casualty; other 
elements of the patrol went on to Bloin and contacted a friendly cavalry group 
there. No feasible bridges nor crossing sites were found between La Roche 
Bernard and Bloin, so the patrol reassembled. Mission accomplished, they started 
back, and Col. Davall proceeded directly to Maior General Grow at Division 
Headquarters, to report on all the information he had obtained. 
The returning patrol found the rest of the battalion in the same place, with 
its status unchanged; and so it remained until on the twentieth of August, "A" 
Company was detached from the Battalion with a separate important mission 
connected with the reduction of Brest, and so, under orders from Higher Head-
quarters, they proceeded ninety miles overland to the vicinity of Landerneau, 
and went into bivouac there. 
While "A" Company was moving toward the Daoulas peninsula, Companies 
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"B" and "C," and the ·Medics proceeded to th~ rear area north of Arzano and 
established a rear bivouac for training purposes. 
Things were getting pretty quiet; Jerry, cooped up m his snug little fortifi-
cations in Lorient, realizing he wasn't going anywhere m a hurry, and we, on 
the other hand were only supposed to contain the city. But, while the remainder 
of the battalion enjoyed the comparative peace and quiet, our recon platoon, 
under Lt. Linebaugh, made daily trips to reconnoiter areas west of the River. 
Col. Davall generally went along with the patrol, and observed from little 
La Pouldu the various kraut activities on the other side of the river over near 
Lorient. And so it went until the 28th of August. 
However, while the above activities were taking place at Lorient, "A" Com-
pany up on the Daoulas peninsula was taking part in quite a scrap. For, on 
August 25th they jumped off in support of foot-slogging sad sacks in the attack 
on Daoulas peninsula in an attempt to secure more advantageous positions for 
the artillery siege of Brest. On the 26th they were assigned the objective of 
Lesquivet, and attained this objective 
at 1730 after a bitter fight; the 
next day, without respite, and forced 
to forage for supplies, they continued 
their attack with Plougastel as the 
objective. An interesting sidelight 
on this action was related by Cap-
tain Polk: It seemed that in the 
heights of the melee, he found him-
self in front of a huge wine and 
cognac store. However, he was too 
busy mowing down krauts to thor-
oughly investigate the store, but he 
vowed that at the earliest practicable 
moment he would return to reap the 
fruits of a hardwon victory. He re-
turned some time later, after he and 
his men had erased all opposition, 
only to find that some atrocity-com-
mitting enemy artilleryman had 
zeroed in on the building and left 
nothing but broken bottles. The fol-
lowing day "A" Company was em-
ployed to bring direct fire on Brest 
installations; in so doing they found 
that every time they moved up on 
the overlooking heights to fire they 
became the target of practically every 
gun in the fortress. But this did 
not phase the Polkmen and they 
caused destruction until their am-
mumtwn gave out. It must be 
admitted that this company was 
assigned missions for which it was 
not suited, and although performed 
under stiff protest, each one was 
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Capt. Fred W. Parker or "Bernie" as he 
was known over the air. A well-liked officer 
who served as communications officer for the 
Battalion as well as Able Co. Commander. 
successful in spite of the handicap of working with the commanders who were 
not too familiar with armored operations. 
On August 29th, the remainder of the battalion at Lorient relieved the 44th 
AlB and occupied dismounted defensive positions with the mission of contain-
mg that portion of Lorien t within its zone. We must mention here that this 
was the first time the tankers were called upon to function as doughs, and that 
we were not particularly well set-up for such an operatiOn, as our small arms 
consisted of Tommy guns and Carbines for the most part of short range, and 
very few dismounted automatic weapons. 
Captain Williford D. Bland was placed in command of the forward C.P. 
and had the following troops under his command: his "B" Company tankers 
( dismounted), Company "A" of the 25th Engineers, Company "A" of the 9th 
AlB, Mortar Platoon 68th, and elements of Headquarters Company of the 68th. 
A regular infantry OPL was set up, complete with wire communications, and 
booby traps and other warning devices ringing forward outposts. The line ran 
generally from Pont Scorff to just short of Quimperle, the outposts were set up 
on dominant hills, and No Man's Land was wooded, ravined, and observation 
was poor except from these high points. Jerry would send out small routine 
foraging and reconnaissance patrols, but never in considerable strength. The 
men had orders not to fire except when absolutely necessary, and often heinie 
patrols would come as close as fifty yards from OP's and yet our well concealed 
positions were not disclosed. But Jerry knew darn well that we were there 
somewhere, and didn't try to come too far. Discipline and training, learned in 
garrison, was now paying off. 
All this time, our Reconnaissance Platoon made daily patrols west of the 
river, combining excellent training with practical observation of German posi-
tions, and the Assault Gun Platoon fired many successful indirect fire missions 
to the great delight of its leader, Lt. Hickerson, and to the obvious dismay of 
the Krauts. Later on, Company "D" gave the Recon Platoon a much needed 
relief on these patrols, and for the first ten days in September, operations went 
on much the same as previously, with companies successively taking their turns 
on the OPL. On the 11th, there was a great deal of activity around the out-
posts, and five enemy prisoners were taken. Perhaps it was due to the presence 
of elements of the 94th Infantry Division, was prepared to relieve us of our sectors 
and Jerry sensed that there was some sort of a change taking place. We have 
omitted one separate action which should be mentioned before we pass on to 
the next phase. On August 5th, the enemy launched an attack in the direction 
of outpost 14 at 1420, and by 1450 had succeeded in outflanking and cutting 
off the OP. This outpost, commanded by 1st Lt. Thomas Hill, held fast, and 
with the aid of our artillerv we were able to drive back the attackers, causing 
many enemy casualties; our losses were one dead and two wounded. Our Bat-
talion Surgeon, Captain Duane H. Callister was seriously wounded in the back 
while attempting to go forward to the aid of a wounded Jerry; he was hit by 
enemy mortar fire. 
On September 13th, the 301st Infantry Regiment relieved our outposts by 
infiltration. All our units came off the line and moved to a rear area, preparing 
to march to Orleans where we were scheduled to be refitted and rested. One 
Platoon of Company "D" under Lt. Siedentop was attached to elements of the 
86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and the remainder of the battalion moved 
out at 1330 toward Orleans, and bivouacked that evening in the vicinity of Augan. 
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"A" C ompany, relieved from the T ask Force at Brest on the 6th, h ad moved 
out by a separate route and already was at Orleans. On the 14th, the battalion 
continued the road march having traveled a distance of a hundred and sixteen 
miles. The next day, we reached the Orleans area , and work began on vehicles, 
weapons, and equipment. Entertainment was furnished for the men, and passes 
to Orleans and nearby M ontargis were issued. Captured Wehrmacht wine and 
cognac was distributed. Morale was sky-high. 
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Pfc. Jose Ruis Hernandez-known as 
" Amigo." Served as the Colonel's left-hand 
man and morale bui lde r ·upper throughout 
the battalion. There was something to be 
desired in his English, French, and German 
vocabulary, but by the use of his hands and 
gestures, he could usually make his wants 
known. 
On the eighteenth of September, we were relieved from CCA and joined 
Reserve Command. The next day Company "D" minus the platoon which 
was still at Brest, moved out for the "Colombay area" and on the twentieth the 
battalion moved out at 0910 and headed for Colombay; we closed in bivouac 
fourteen miles west of T royes on Route N-60: The following day the Battalion 
continued marching to the east and closed in a tactical bivouac in the vicinity 
of Colombay at 1745, and was relieved from Reserve Command and assigned 
to Division control. We were subsequently assigned to XX Corps. On the 
23rd of September we were ordered to join CCR at T oul, but on arrival there 
we were met by Corps Liaison officer and ordered directly to Briey. We remained 
at Briey until September 29th when we were ordered to move to Nancy. At 
1800 the column was closed of Saulxures-Les Nancy and troops were billeted 
in the town. The following day we made minor shifts in troop billets and the 
CP moved to Tomblaine. At 1830 we were alerted to move to an assembly area 
in the vicinity of Pettencourt where we closed at 2340. 
Our duties hadn't been arduous at Briey; quite the contrary, we had become 
quite comfortable there in the enviable position of the corps reserve, but then 
toute de suite came the fast road march, the assembly at Pettencourt, and we were 
back in the thick of it again. This job was to be a line-strengthener, a nasty 
limited objective attack, designed to secure for the army more advantageous posi-
tions from which to launch later a large scale offensive. In other words, elements 
of the division would be attacking, and there draw the undivided attention of the 
krauts in front of us. 
The battalion jumped off at 0600, . after a considerable artillery preparation, 
with Companies "A" and "B" up and abreast. Companies "A" and "B" of the 
9th AlB followed in the second wave and Company "C" (-) of 603rd T.D. 
Battalion disposed with one platoon to cover the left flank of the attack, and 
the other assembled as a covering force in the event of an enemy counter-attack. 
Companies "D ," 68th, and "C" 9th AlB were initially in task force reserve, 
while Company "C" 68th was in division reserve. Our objective was the high 
The 68th in th:t rough sh ew outside of N3ncy on 
Octol:er 1944. 
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ground south of the Seille River east of Gremecy Wood. We were operating 
in this coordinated attack under CCR, and at the same time CCB was making 
a similar attack on our left flank in the woods. 
The attack was methodically carried out, and by 1040 our objective was 
obtained by the first and second wave. The control of all leading elements 
was exceptionally good under conditions which lent to confusion, for enemy small 
arms fire was heavy, and their artillery fire was extremely heavy, and also the 
infantry were not employed at the proper time. At 1100, Company "D" was 
committed to hold the ground west of Chambrey, covering the elements and 
screening the task force's right flank. While the lead elements waited there for 
elements of the 35th Division to come up and secure this hard-won obiective, 
the enemy artillery became intense, and our sharp-shooting Assault Gun Platoon 
was called up to nullify direct fire weapons to our left front in a well defiladed 
position; they consequently poured merciless fire on the positio,ns with excellent 
observed results. At 1330, the task force withdrew to its forward rally point 
prepared to support the doughs in the event of an enemy counter-attack. The 
artillery fire continued to rain on our vulnerable positions, but finally at 1940 the 
battalion went into reserve and assembled in the vicinity of Pettencourt, while 
Company "C" remained in position to cover the withdrawal of the force and to 
support the 35th doughs as they perfected their defensive positions on the ob-
jective. Then, at 2340 Company "C" was relieved and returned to the battalion 
assembly area. Its mission had been accomplished, but the battalion had suffered 
greatly in so doing; our casualties were four killed in action, 24 wounded, and 
a vehicular loss of 2 tanks destroyed. But the greatest blow was the loss of 
Captains Polk and Bland who died in the heroic performance of their duties, and 
Major Brown, who had two tanks shot from under him and was seriously wounded 
while trying to get to the third. There were countless acts of heroism during 
this costly action; it would take pages to recount one tenth of them. There was 
the Recon Platoon intrepidly blowing paths through a mine field under terrific 
artillery fire: there was Lt. Olan Hafely, who took over "A" Company, when 
Captain Polk was killed, and successfully led it to its objective, and who was 
all the while seriously wounded. These are only two of many. 
The next clay, the battalion moved back to billets in Tomblaine; we left "C" 
Company near vicinity of Pettencourt, for they were assigned the mission of 
blocking Route N-74, and were attached to a Third Army task force. As you 
can well imagine, the men were exhausted, and we were badly in need of re-
organization and rest, so Col. Davall prescribed the maximum rest possible and the 
men bedded clown. Before going any further, and before the memory of bloody 
October 1st fades away (most of us will never forget it), we would like to quote 
one statistic which sums up the action in a few words: Of the thirty-seven 
tank commanders in the first attack wave, eighteen were either killed or wounded. 
One whole day of rest passed without interruption, and things began to look 
a little more normal; it has never failed to amaze us how quickly these Davall-
men recovered from such a wracking ordeal. Then on the following day, Task 
Force Britton, composed of Company "B" 68th, Company "D" 9th AlB, and one 
platoon of the 603rd T.D.'s, moved out to take over the Third Army road block, 
and relieYecl "C" Company. General Patton was taking no chances on losing 
our hard-won ground to an enemy counter-attack. 
As the remainder of the outfit rested and reorganized, TF Britton , with 
Major Britton, Battalion Executive Officer, in command, and 2nd Lt. Burns, 
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his exec, completely organized and consolidated the position and got set for an 
enemy counter-attack. The expected attack never came, although Jerry's artillery 
never stopped, and each night we went to sleep to the tune of screaming shells 
and the washing machine sound of Bed Check Charlie ( kraut observation 
planes). Then, on the sixth of October, Task Force Britton was relieved by 
elements of the 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and returned to the 
battalion area. However, immediately upon their return, the battalion was put 
on a two hour alert status, and all commanders and platoon leaders were out for 
a reconnaissance in the vicinitv of Chenicourt. Was another of those line-
straighteners in the making? ' 
The next day, the battalion was relieved from CCR and assigned to CCB, 
with "B" Company being attached to Task Force Godfrey ( an armored infantry 
task force) . We were alerted to move at 0700 the following morning. Then, 
at 0730, Task Fo~ce Davall moved out to an assembly area in the vicinity of Leor. 
A short while later we moved a little farther north and closed in a tactical bivouac 
at Chenicourt at 1530. 
This was to be another limited objective attack, and the whole division was 
to occupy more advantageous ground north of Nancy, in preparation for the push 
which we all felt was building up. TF Davall moved out at 0630 for the line of 
departure, and jumped off in its attack on the BOIS DE TRAPPE at 0740. 
Enemy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire was intense, but ot1rs was more so, 
and by 1300 the objective had been taken. Our division artillery, supported 
by heavier corps howitzers, poured several TOT's on the kraut positions and these 
had a devastating effect. Elements of the 6th Infantry Division were supposed 
to take over the objective once we had gained it, and while we were waiting for 
them to take over, a small counter-attack developed, but was repulsed. It seemed 
as though the 80th would never get around to relieving us and we sweated it out 
until 1600 when they completed the job of tying in and digging in on the position. 
Then the task force moved out to a bivouac in the vicinity of the Agincourt from 
which point we were to support the 80th Division in the event of counter-attack. 
Our move was very difficult, as it was as black as pitch, the rain was coming 
down in torrents, and Jerry never stopped shelling us, but we finally closed at 
0420 on the tenth. 
We remained in the position uneventfully until October 19th, and . while we 
were not called upon to assist the 80th, it rained cats and dogs all the time, and 
Jerry, if he thought things were getting too peaceful, would occasion~lly lob over 
some big stuff. Everyone was completely miserable, and was not a bit sorry when 
we were eventually relieved. So, we moved back to Tomblaine to our billets, and 
stayed there without interruption until November seventh. 
S j Sgt. (Later Lt.) Burger, Sgt. Sullivan, 
Pfc. Ninfo, Sgt. Haney, and Sgt. Foutch en-
tertain Red Cross Girls near Nancy. 
We spent this period of tactical 
inactivity in rest, rehabilitation and 
maintenance. Also, once were shaken 
down, and prepared for anything, 
passes to Nancy were granted, we 
had daily moving pictures, and beer 
was plentiful. Dances were organized, 
the local belles invited, and friend-
ships between French and Americans 
mushroomed here and there. 
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And all this til]le, supplies were being built up and stored, equipment was 
replaced, tanks tuned up. Toward the end of the above mentioned period, there 
was a preceptible step-up in the tempo; plans were made and discussed, and while 
all was top secret, there was that feeling in the air. Something big was up! 
Then, we were all told what it was all about. We were going to crack Jerry's 
outer defensive shell, and then push to the Saar River, through the Siegfried Line 
if we caught him sufficiently off balance, keep going to the Rhine if we could 
drag him down, and knock him out! All the armies poised all along the line 
were to jump off. And we knew where the armor would be, as usual, out in 
front, running broken field, if we were shaken loose. 
CWO Joseph H. Exner 
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The hard working Personnel Section. 
Although they weren't where the shooting was 
taking place, they often put in from 12 to 18 
hours each day in compiling various reports 
which had to be forwarded to higher head-
quarters. CWO Exner has been complimented 
many times upon the accuracy and prompt 
accomplishment of these reports, and when it 
was time to come home, the service records 
were in excellent shape. Pictured below are 
T /Sgt. Hogan; T / 4 Lawrence, Hq. Co.; Sgt. 
Michel, Morning Report Clerk; a view of their 
office in Germany; and finally, Cpl. Pennal 
of Charlie; Kelly of Baker; Leapley of Able; 
Vintza of Service; and Lenz of Dog. 
Completely ready in every sense of the word the battalion moved out of 
Tomblaine at 0800 on November 8th to an assembly area south of Leyr. It was 
rammg heavily when we closed in bivouac there at 1000, and we spent the 
night there. 
The following day, with the rain still pouring down and the ground becoming 
increasingly muddy and boggy, TF Davall travelled to a forward assembly area 
in the vicinity of Menoncourt. But, even such miserable conditions did not 
dampen the men's certainty that we were starting on the final drive to end the 
war by Christmas. In addition to the downpour's muddying up the ground, 
the Seille River had reached flood level, and during the night the approaches 
to the pontoon bridge north of Menoncourt were washed out. So, unable to 
cross the river, we remained in our assembly area that night. 
On the morning of the tenth, we moved up to Nomeny and crossed the 
river there, and as continous maintenance of the approaches was necessary the 
pontoon bridge proved to be a traffic bottleneck, and our tail didn't clear until 
early in the afternoon. Then, we proceeded north through Mailly-Sur-Seille 
to the Bois De Seigneur. We contacted no enemy on this approach, but our 
progress was greatly hampered by fallen trees on the road, and we couldn't risk 
taking to the open fields because of the terrain's boggy condition. With the task 
force in an approach march formation, "A" Company was in the advance guard, 
and it used the dozer tank to clear the trees from the route. The advance guard 
moved from Secourt by way of Sailly to Achatel, and as the bridge across the 
railroad north of Achatel was destroyed, "A" Company left the road and forced 
a crossing in order to support an attack by the 318th Infantry Regiment on the 
town of Moncheux. The remainder of the task force turned back to Secourt, 
and proceeded northeast to a grade crossing of the same railroad, and thence 
southeast to Moncheux. When they arrived there, they found the town already 
captured by the doughs. So, Task Force Davall went into bivouac northeast 
of the Moncheux. During the night, we were subjected to severe shelling. 
Next morning, the task force jumped off and continued its drive east. The 
advance guard encountered a culvert on the road to Tragny, and the bridge across 
the stream southwest of the town was completely demolished by the enemy early 
that morning. An attempt to cross was impossible, so the force turned back and 
tried to proceed on secondary roads through the BOIS DE JUVILLE, but all 
trails through these wo<;>ds were discovered impassable. Our leading element be-
came bogged down while trying to bypass the woods to the south; this also re-
sulted in their being subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire. Then, a new 
·combat team was fonned from elements of the task force, which included Com-
anies "A" and "D" under the command of Major Britton, Battalion Exec. Their 
mission was to move cross country and to be in direct support of Task Force Elm, 
made up mainly of the 318th Infantry Regiment, in their attack on T ragny and 
Thimonville. Meanwhile, the rest of Task Force Davall returned to the main 
road to T ragny to await the completion of the engineer bridge. During this 
time Combat team Britton was busy cleaning out Thimonville of enemy troops 
who had remained hidden or filtered back into the town after the infantry regiment 
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had passed through. After finishing this task, Major Britton moved his unit 
toward Morville sur Nied and thence toward Baudrecourt. The ground was still 
not suited to tank warfare and General "Mud" still held full command of the 
area. The bridge south of Baudrecourt was found destroyed and the combat 
team was ordered to bivouac southwest of the town. The remainder of Col. 
Davall's moved east when the three bridges in the vicinity of Tragny were com-
pleted, then later closed in bivouac at Morville sur Nied after dark, and remained 
there for the night. During the night, an attached engineer platoon was sent 
forward to repair the blown bridge holding up Combat Team Britton south of 
Baudrecourt. The unit under Maj. Britton was once again under the direct 
control of the Battalion commander. 
That night the engineers, while working under very difficult conditions, com-
pleted the bridge at Baudrecourt, and on the morning of the twelfth our elements 
crossed and entered the town. Our leading elements ran into light resistance 
and small arms fire but continued forward. Company A was sent to join 9th 
Armd. Infantry Battalion and moved north from town with the mission of seizing 
and holding the bridge across the La Rotte River, between Baudrecourt and Vati-
mont. The bridge was found to be demolished. While in that area the unit 
was ambushed just north of the railroad tracks which ran by the river. Company 
A having two platoons back as a holding and covering force was able to extri-
cate the one platoon receiving the fire. Meanwhile Company C was dispatched 
northeast of the town to block all 
approaches in that area. Company 
D moved out of town on a road 
south and east of town, blocking that 
approach. Reports from prisoners, and 
aerial reconnaissance were that the 
enemy was well dug in in all areas 
east of Baudrecourt. They had good 
artillery and direct fire support, plus 
terrain features which were to their 
credit. At 1400, some units of the 
318th Infantry Regiment who moved 
into to town prepared to attack across 
the river and establish a bridgehead 
on the north side so that the en-
gineers could repair the bridge. Com-
pany A took up positions generally 
along the railroad track south of 
the river and prepared to support 
this attack by direct fire. The new 
attack began shortly after 1400 and 
coincided with an attack by Task 
Force "Godfrey on Vatimont at our 
left. Little opposition was encoun-
tered and the bridgehead was suc-
cessfully established. Meanwhile 
Companies A, C, and D were drawn 
into defensive positions around the 
north and east side of town, and a 
security detachment was provided for 
the engineers during the construction 
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Major Frank K. Britton-served as plans 
and operations officer from the beginning 
of the campaign until 1 October, and then 
as Executive Officer unti I he assumed com-
mand of an infantry battalion early in 
November. A very aggressive, but well-liked 
man. 
of their bridge. The enemy had used a great deal of artillery while in their 
defensive positions and as we neared their batteries these guns were fired as 
direct fire weapons. We paid a high price in officers during this small offensive: 
Lt. Thomas G. Hill, company commander of Company C .was killed by artillery 
fire while dismounting from his tank. Also, Capt. Klotz, commanding Company 
A was wounded and evacuated as well as some much needed platoon leaders. 
In many Companies Platoon Sgts. were now placed in charge of platoons. The 
loss of two company commanders as well as some platoon leaders meant a complete 
reorganization of the leaders of the Battalion. The Task Force, meanwhile, re-
mained in Baudrecourt during the night. Heavy shelling continued at night, 
which meant that "Jerry" was not moving out and was going to hold his ground. 
By this time, it was evident to all that a piledriving breakthrough, as was 
the case in Normandy and Brittany, would not be on the menu here; more in 
the order of a steady hammering, grinding drive for time in order to withdraw 
the necessary troops to the Siegfried defenses. Also, quagmire fields restricted 
our mobility and maneuverability, and Jerry was defending ground and towns 
that he knew and chose. But the attack continued. 
Shortly after noon on the thirteenth, we left Baudrecourt and struck out for 
Vatimont, but soft mud at the crossing site and the necessity for continuous 
road repair resulted in extremely slow operation. So it was late afternoon before 
the column had cleared the north bank of the river. Thence, we proceeded to 
Arraincourt and secured the town for the night. 
Here is an interesting sidelight on our capture of Arraincourt: When "B" 
Company entered the town a hysterically glad character rushed out to meet 
the lead tank. It was an American pilot, Walter Jensen by name, who had been 
shot down in that vicinity several weeks before, and who had been hidden and 
fed since that time by a French family; he stayed with us that night, and we 
evacuated him the next morning, with his gratitude knowing no bounds. We 
on the other hand told him how sincerely we appreciated the support his fellow 
fighter pilots had been giving us, and how much better we felt when we saw 
the destruction-bearing P-47s in the sky, and how eagerly we were waiting for 
them now; the rain and overcast skies had grounded them for a long time now. 
On the following morning, Task Force Davall jumped off in an attack along 
the axis of an east-west road through Boulange, Suisse, apd Landroff. (The 
attack was systematically undertaken, and each of the towns was taken in the 
following manner). Before going into a description of the assault, there is an 
important factor to be considered. It was becoming more and more apparent 
that Jerry was sticking close to the towns in his defense, and ignoring dominating 
terrain features from which he could much better halt our advance. So, after 
careful scrutinizing and estimate of the terrain and condition of the ground, 
Colonel Davall employed the following plan with success: Company "C" moved 
east along the high ground north of, and generally paralleling the road. Company 
"A," reinforced by one platoon of tank destroyers and a platoon of infantry, 
moved east on the road. As each town was reached, is was taken under fire by 
Company "A," while "C" Company began a limited enveloping movement from 
the high ground. When "C" Company had reached a position dominating the 
town, it covered by fire, while "A" Company moved in and seized the town. 
Forward elements were ordered to hold up at Landroff, and Captain Smith, bat-
talion S-3 was sent forward to organize and hold the town. Company "D" was 
committed to secure "C" Company's left, west flank on the high ground north-
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west of Landroff, and extend along the high ground to the west, thus blocking 
the approach from the north, and protecting the Suisse-Landroff road, the only 
line of communications between the two towns. Our neck was sticking out, and 
we had to thoroughly tie-in and organize our positions. With the battalion CP 
in Suisse, the force in Landroff was reinforced by a second platoon of infantry, 
now placing in the town one medium tank company, two platoon of infantry, and 
one tank destroyer platoon. 
At about 1800, tl~e enemy launched a counter-attack on Landroff. He was in 
considerable infantry strength, and was supported by eight SP guns or tanks. 
Two were knocked out by "A" Company's sharp shooters, and the rest with-
drew. The dismounted elements, however, continued to press the attack, but 
were finally driven off by all the fire we could muster, including artillery. This 
attack had been launched from the north and approached town along the main 
north-south road; it was preceded by a marked increase of artillery concentra-
tion which had been falling constantly on Landroff since the entry of the task 
force, and it continued to fall throughout the night, in spite of our counter-bat-
tery fire. Then, at 2100, Jerry tried another counter-attack, again from the same 
direction, and again he suffered heavy losses and was repulsed at 2140. The situ-
ation was becoming grim, and so the garrison there was reinforced by Company 
1'C" of the 44th Armored Infantry Battalion. But the krauts hadn't given up 
by a long shot, and they attacked again at 2330. Once again, however, our hard-
bitten defenders drove them off with more losses. At this time, several TOTs 
were fired on the woods northeast of Landroff, where we determined that the 
Germans were forming their attacks. A total of 18 battalions, all types, fired 
this artillery mission. 
So far so good, but it soon developed that what had taken place up to now 
was only the entree, for at 0130, Jerry made his main effort. Also, this time 
again, he launched his strong infantry attack along the same axis of approach. 
Our defenders stood fast, and although the main force of this attack formation 
was broken before it reached the town, they threw aside their attack formation, 
and desperatly carried on with infiltration tactics. The night was pitch dark, 
and so, under this nat-
ural concealment, they 
succeeded in getting 
many men into town, 
and in cutting the east-
west road at the west 
end of Landroff. Here 
began a melee at close 
quarters and hand-to-
hand that went on for 
the rest of the night. 
There were countless 
individual acts of hero-
ism, and it would be 
impossible to recount 
all of them. To name 
only a few, there was 
Captain Smith, who 
performed a herculean 
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Major General Grow, the Division Commander pinning 
the Distinguished Service Cross on Major Daniel E. Smith 
for his actions at Landroff, France on 14-15 November 1944. 
task in the defense of the town, and emerged from countless hand-to-hand 
combats unscratched only to be finally shot in the course of the night by a 
kraut dough at point blank range, but he killed him in spite of the slug he 
was carrying in his leg, and . carried on without even stopping. He was 
awarded a Distinguished Service• Cross for his part in the heroic defense. We 
can single out only a few of "A" Company's brave defenders such as S jSgt. 
Shumway, Sgt. Foutch, Sj Sgt. Berger, Lt. Kratzer, and T j5 Joe Kaminski, but 
in order to really do justice we should submit the entire "A" Company roster for 
heroic gallantry in repelling the foe. There was T /5 James Pye of the Medics, 
to mention only one of our detachment there who labored without concern for 
their personal safety. Suffice it to say that all there covered themselves with 
glory in their magnificent stand, and in so doing wrecked completely what amounted 
to almost an enemy division in total strength. That hectic, never-to-be-forgotten 
night at Landroff broke our opponent's back, and although he would still be 
able to delay us by bringing other troops in before us, he was never again in our 
sector to offer a serious threat! 
We held our defensive positions there until we were passed through by elements 
of the 80th Division. They had finally seen the light somewhere way upstairs, 
and had decided that this was no spearheading breakthrough, but an infantry 
show. Nevertheless, when passed through by the doughs, we consolidated our• 
positions around Landroff and Suisse, and remained there until the twenty-
second of November, reorganizing, and giving our vehicles some badly needed 
Our "Gold Dust Twins" of the Medics-
T /5 Ranck and T /5 Pye. Both very capable 
medical men, but in addition had an inquisi-
tiveness which loaded their peep with items 
which weren't always of a medical nature. 
maintenance. However, while this 
shake-down and rehabilitation was 
taking place, Company "B" was as-
signed to Task Force Brown, and 
took part in the attack of Bincheville, 
before reverting to 69th control. Task 
forces of the division alternately kept 
pushing Jerry back toward the Saar, 
and this grinding was coordinated 
with attacks by the doughs; the 80th 
had slid north to screen the corps 
flank and the 35th, another veteran 
infantry division, was now working 
with us. The 68th, skillfully brought 
along in this rehabilation by a com-
mander who was tops, was rounding 
into shape again. 
On November 23rd, a platoon 
of engineers, a platoon of infantry, 
Company "D," and the dozer were 
placed under CCA's direct control 
for a reconnaissance in force mission 
in the vicinity of Lelling, and while 
they were on this iob, Company "D" 
was attached to Task Force Brown 
( 44th AlB), and Task Force Davall 
moved out for the Freybouse-Freme-
stroff area. Then, when its action 
was no longer required at Lelling, 
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"D" Company, now under 1st Lt. William H. Collins, returned to the fold. 
We almost forgot something! Here it was "Thanksgiving," and even though 
the setting wasn't exactly a holiday one, our commanders were determined, front 
line or not, to see that everyone enjoyed a thanksgiving dinner. The kitchens 
were brought up, and the cooks prepared excellent turkey dinners with all the 
fixings. At one company in particular the holiday feast will never be forgotten. 
"C" Company, with Task Force Brown, was undergoing very heavy shelling at 
Gessling-Hemering, and all the tanks were · on the line. As the mess was set up 
in town, it was necessary for the men to infiltrate to their chow by a series of 
zig-zag dashes from the line. Dinner music was furnished by the screaming 
meemies. And while the festivities were in full swing, some heinie artilleryman, 
showing no respect for American customs, decided to liven up the party. He 
sent a well placed eighty-eight shell into a nearby manure pile, thus giving both 
men and food an unwelcome shower. That was how "C" Company celebrated 
Thanksgiving! 
At 1000 on the 25th, Company "B," 68th, and Company "C" of the 44th AlB 
jumped off in an attack on the high grounds and woods north of Fremestroff. 
But the condition of the ground was still too soft, and the attack bogged down. 
However, the force took up defensive positions on the southern slopes of the 
hill north of town. Then on the following day, Companies "A" and "C" 44th 
launched another attack on the same hill, and had secured the objective at 1300, 
while undergoing heavy mortar fire. Our Companies "A" and "B" moved up 
to the crest and consolidated the position at 1430. The attack was preceded by 
heavy artillery concentrations on the woods, and on the ridge. No resistance 
was encountered on the ground. Incidently, this was part of the rear zone of 
the Maginot Line, and concrete pillboxes were built around the ground, supple-
mented by earthwork entrenchments. Had Jerry chosen to hold these fortified 
positions, he could have made it very difficult for us, but he abandoned them 
without a struggle; his position was untenable as Task Force Brown was in a 
position to outflank him from the northwest. 
For the next two days we maintained defensive positions on this high ground 
north of Fremestroff, and awaited further orders. 
On the 29th of November, we were ordered to attack and seize the towns of 
Lanning and Lixing. The plan called for the platoon of the 86th Recon to 
move out first, and slide off to the left flank, followed by "B" Company directly 
attacking Lixing and "C" Company of the 44th to encircle Lanning and Lixing 
from the high ground north of Fremestroff. But when "H" hour arrived none 
of the deployed elements were able to move out as they were hampered by the 
boggy condition of the ground. So, Col. Davall ordered his Reconnaissance Pla-
toon, commanded by 2nd Lt. Robert J. Burns, Jr. to push an aggressive swift re-
connaissance in force into Lixing, and to go as far beyond it as they could. So 
they moved out quickly, barrelled down the road to a point just short of the 
town, worked through the town dismounted, reported no opposition, and the 
presence of large craters blocking armored advance on the main road, discovered 
a bypass, found an abatis road block north of town, slid around it, and were 
finally brought to a halt by a huge anti-tank ditch. And here is a point which 
makes every member of that small force thank their lucky stars when they 
think of it. For, when the elements in the rear finally hit the road to Lixing, 
the second peep was blown sky-high by a mine in the middle of the road short 
of the town, and many more were later discovered in carefully concealed positions. 
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And yet, every vehicle in the Recon Platoon had sped over the same spot previ-
ously, miraculously missing all the mines. 
Thus were the battalion objectives taken, and were later secured with the 
arrival of "B" Company and "C" Company of the doughs. We' remained there, 
until late the following day, when it was decided by higher headquarters to dissolve 
Task Force Davall. There was no longer any need for further pushing north, 
as the 80th had hooked down and had made contact with us. Once more as 
a battalion we moved into billets in Lanning, Maxstadt, and Leyviller. 
For the first four days of December, we spent our time in maintaining our 
vehicles, weapons, and personal equipment. Then, on the fifth day, Companies 
"C" and "D" were attached to Task Force Brown, Company "A" was attached 
to Task Force Wall (50th AlB), the Assault Gun Platoon to the direct control 
of CCA, and the balance of the battalion was attached to CCR. These attach-
ments were made in preparation for the divisions assault on the important Dieb- , 
ling, Tenteling, Metzing area. 
The attack by Task Force Brown and Task Force Wall jumped off at 0630 
from the vicinity of Henriville in a northeasterly direction, with TF Wall on 
the right. The advance went slowly as the Wall force met stiff opposition on 
the southeast flank, and Col. Brown's doughs took a great deal of methodical 
time to screen through the Buchwald woods. Two bridgeheads were gained across 
the stream at Farbersviller and Farschviller, the first by the 80th Division, and 
the second by Task Force Wall. Company "D" crossed at the Fabersviller site, 
and proceeded along the road screening the left flank of the task force. T heir 
committment was hurried and their indefinitely assigned limit was reached so 
speedily that the Collinsmen were precariously out on a limb for a while, wait-
ing for the advance of the other elements of the attacking force. However, they 
took every advantage of cover and concealment and sweated out further develop-
ments. Company "C" in the meanwhile, crossed the stream at Farschviller and 
supported the doughs in screening through the Buchwald woods, thence pushing 
through to take Diebling. Company "A" crossed at the same place and, moving 
up with Task Force Wall, took Metzing. 
The action continued hot and heavy as Company "D," receiving fire from 
Ebering, latched onto a platoon of infantry and swung north to clean out the 
town. The "lights" were hot that day, raring to go, and, under the leadership 
of their company commander, went through Ebering like a dose of salts. "C" 
Company, crashing along in high gear, flushed out Tenteling. This attack had 
Lt. William Sieden-
top, Lt. George Hughes 
( Battlefield Commis-
sion), and Lt. Brown. 
All of Dog Co. 
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originally started out as an infantry show, supported by tanks, but it gained mo-
mentum, the tanks slammed ahead, leaving the doughs behind to mop up. Several 
heinie artillery batteries were overrun and smashed during this hectic action. 
The breakthrough had reached a point now that rendered close cooperation be-
tween task forces impossible. 
After the capture of Diebling by Company "C," its calm unhurried C.O. 
Captain James A. Russell, was ordered to attack Cadenbronn Heights. Moving 
quickly up on the right flank was Company "B" under Captain Ross C. Brown. 
The attack had been so vicious that we had now advanced beyond the objective 
assigned by higher headquarters, and Cadenbronn had previously been reckoned 
a difficult objective to be assaulted at a later date. However, here was considered 
a chance to kill two birds with one stone. This attack jumped off at 1700 from 
Dieblirig; Company "B" while moving up the slopes northeast of Diebling came 
under heavy anti-tank fire from the vicinity of Metzing. It was dusk. Visibility 
was poor, and ground was extremely soft, thus greatly hindering their mobility. 
Company B, partially bogged down, was unable to extricate itself from this 
quagmire. Enemy anti-tank guns in well defiladed positions blazed away at 
"Baker's right flank" and knocked out seven tanks. With their two remaining 
vehicles they took their part of the objective. The final objective was secured 
by both Baker and Charlie at 1750. 
During the above mentioned assault a very unusual incident occurred. Before 
Company A reached Metzing Lt. Kratzer's tank was hit and all members of the 
crew bailed out. Unknown to them Tech. 4th Grade Shunk, the driver had been 
instantly killed and he was in such 
a position that his foot kept the 
accelerator depressed and the vehicle 
rolled on in low gear, a dead man 
at the levers, through the enemy lines 
into the town, and beyond it, des-
cribing great lumbering circles before 
it came to a halt. 
This proved to be a costly, yet 
amazing successful day's operations, 
&nd all involved were rightly proud 
of a job well done. We Tankers 
had stabbed deep into the enemy's 
underbelly. We had them on the 
run but darkness dropped a curtain 
on the day's operations. 
On the sixth the remaining ele-
ments of the task force closed in 
the vicinity of Tenteling, and when 
all the attachments reverted to Bat-
Captain Ross C. Brown-an officer 
well-liked by everyone. Very meticu-
lous in everything he did, let nothing 
excite him, and was always dependable 
in delivering the goods. 
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talion control, we were assigned a defensive se<;tor north of Ebering-Tenteling, under 
control of CCR. During the succeeding days until the 13th of December, we held 
and improved our defensive position. Then we were relieved in this sector by 
elements of the 9th AlB and 69th Tank Battalion. When the relief had been 
completed the Battalion went into Division reserve and moved into billets in 
Lanning, Maxstadt, and Biding, where we remained until December 17th and 
devoted our time to rest and refitting. 
Then, on the 18th of December the Battalion moved to Merlebach where 
all troops were comfortably billeted in town. We continued our program of rest 
and maintenance there, and entertainment was provided. Shower facilities were 
excellent. 
T / 5 Willie Call-Susie and he traveled 
quite a few miles in the resupply of the 
battalion. 
Cpl. Daniels-One of the most popular 
men of the battalion-The ration corporal 
who brought rations, cigarettes and choco-
late for eating or whatever purpose pre-
sented itself. 
'l 
Our stay at Merlebach was a very pleasant one. We enjoyed recreation 
of every sort, and had, in our reserve capacity, ample time to catch up on our 
maintenance of vehicles, weapons and equipment. But, just when we were 
beginning to get very comfortable, things started popping in the northern sector 
of the allied line, and Von Rundstedt pulled his famous counter-attack, and con-
ditions up there began to look pretty serious. We immediately anticipated that 
the "Super Sixth" would be called on soon to help put out the fire. We'd had 
things too easy lately! Then, and on December 22nd we were alerted for move-
ment in this direction. 
On the following evening, with other elements of the division, the battalion 
set out from Merlebach on a night march back to Metz. The move west was 
smooth and swift, and we closed there at 0600. The troops were billeted in the 
City, and devoted the rest of the day and evening to celebrating Christmas 
Eve, most of the time was spent on personal maintenance with special emphasis 
placed on lubrication! 
Merry Christmas! We did manage to have a wonderful holiday dinner and 
recover, and then we moved out on another night concealed march to Lanningen, 
Luxembourg. The reason for the last two night marches was, as you can well 
imagine, because enemy air in support of Von Rundstedt's attack was very active 
and out in force. But we closed at our assigned destination without mishap at 
0600 the following morning, where we remained until the 29th, waiting for 
further orders. We were still operating under the c;ontrol of CCA, but when we 
were ordered to Haberu, Belgium, and closed there at 1730, we came under 
the control of CCB. Then, just before midnight on the following day, we 
departed from Haberu enroute to Bastogne. The roads were ice covered and 
so very dangerous, causing several accidents and changes in routes. Our prog-
ress was carefully slow, and at Vaux-Les-Rosieres, CCA of the 11th Armored 
Division turned on our route of advance from the east, thus blocking the road 
and causing us several hours delay. 
Previous plans had called for our making an attack north of Bastogne at 
0800, but the above-mentioned difficulties held up our approach march to the 
line of departure in the vicinity of Bizory so that we were ordered into a bivouac 
with the rest of the combat command in an area south of Sibret. At 2300 we 
resumed our march to the Bastogne area. 
The NEW YEAR started off with a bang. With the CP closed at Bastogne, 
and the companies in an assembly area at the road junction northeast of Bas-
togne. Our attack, after a careful reconnaissance by all troop leaders involved, 
jumped off at 0840, and Col. Davall employed the following plan: Company 
"B" 68th, took up direct fire position on the nose of the hill which lay in the 
triangle of roads northeast of Bastogne and north of the main east-west road 
covering the high ground west of Magaret. Company "A," with a platoon of 
tank destroyers swung around through Bizory, and began an envelopment of the 
hill overlooking Magaret, covered all the while by "B" Company's base of fire. 
When ABLE had secured position on the approach to the hill, Company "B" 
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50th AlB moved through our Baker Company's posrtwns to the stream west 
of Magaret, where the men dismounted from their half-tracks and began the 
assault of the hill on foot. "A" company was held up for a short while by 
a mine field in the vicinity of Bizory, but the attack was resumed at 0940. Our 
initial objective was taken at 1010. The force moved out at 1030 toward Magaret, 
and at 1145 Company "A" followed by the infantry, entered the town. Our 
attacking force encountered considerable resistance from enemy small arms, mortar, 
and artillery fire on the approach to Magaret, but inflicted severe casualties 
on the foe, and captured 68 prisoners. The town was finally cleaned out and 
secured bv 1400. Then Company "B" swung north of Magaret and pushed up 
to take the higher ground overlooking Arloncourt. With the CP in Magaret, 
Company "D" was sent to the northern portion of the task force sector to con-
nect with Task Force W all; Baker Company pulled back on the line with Company 
"D," and "A" Company took positions on "B" Company's south flank and tied 
in with Task Force Kennedy south of us. Thus, this defensive line, running 
northwest-southeast, north and east of Magaret, was held during the night. 
Perhaps it will help bring a better understanding of our situation, if you recall 
that Von Rundstedt's drive had been hitherto quite successful; it was a highly 
geared drive, up to now unchecked, that had gained a great momentum and 
although they had been momentarily stymied at Bastogne, the krauts had spread 
out on the flanks and were still rolling. The Sixth Armored Division, however, 
was attacking in the face of all this, and, faced with this tremendous task, was 
knifing in to check this push firstly, slow it down, probe for weak spots in the 
enemy's lines, and then started grinding them back. A not too pleasant prospect-
a job that was to go down in our books as one to call on the greatest possible 
courage, stamina, and bitterest fighting we had ever known! The men of the 
68th faced this prospect, knowing full well what it would entail, calmly con-
fident of their ability to defeat the best that Germany could hurl against us again. 
So we settled down for the night in Magaret which was still burning in places 
from the shelling we had subjected it to earlier in the day. Then at two o'clock 
in the morning, Jerry launched a strong dismounted counter-attack from the 
direction of Benonchamps along the axis of the Benonchamps-Magaret road. At 
the same time bombs were dropped in and around the defensive positions by a 
lone enemy plane, and helped us here by dropping them in the midst of the 
counter-attackers. When we had frustrated this attempt, the enemy side-slipped 
to the west, approaching Magaret along the draw and stream bed from the 
south. The attack was finally stopped at 0400, after some of the krauts had 
infiltrated into town and gotten to within 75 yards of the Charlie Peter. This 
was our first taste of what was to happen time and again in a seemingly end-
less succession. 
Shortly after noon on the 2nd, the attack on Arloncourt was resumed. "A" 
Company took direct fire position to cover the approach of "B" Company mov-
ing from the west. Then, Baker Company assumed firing positions in the 
draw south and west of Arloncourt, while "B" of the 50th was brought up 
and screened the woods south of the town. At this point, our attacking force 
was taken under very heavy anti-tank fire and small arms fire in and around 
the town. As a consequence, all but one of "B" Company's tanks were knocked 
out, and the doughs suffered very heavy casualties and were pinned down. The 
positions became so untenable and exposed that it was necessary to withdraw 
the force under cover of smoke. Company "B" and the platoon of infantry 
were pulled back into Magaret, and Col. Davall shortened his defensive line, 
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tying in with TF Kennedy (69th Tk Bn.) who moved up from the south and 
assumed part of our previous sector. 
On the 3rd of January, Task Force Davall maintained its defensive position. 
The enemy counter-attacked in the morning with tanks and infantry, but was 
repulsed with many casualties. At that time AT guns, in well concealed and 
defiladed positions fired on "A" Company's line of tanks, destroying four, and 
making their position untenable, it was imperative that they be withdrawn. 
Then at 1500, the task force 'withdrew in orderly fashion to better defensive 
positions north and east of Bizory. We must' mention the fact here that while 
it was a necessary move and one to better our position, it was the first time in 
our experience that we had had to mo:ve to the rear due to enemy pressure. 
It was a bitter pill to swallow-to yield ground that we had fought so hard 
to gain, but it had to be. However, every mother's son there vowed to turn the 
tables with a vicious vengeance as soon as possible! 
The Battalion CP withdrew to a point north of Bastogne, and Captain 
McKenna took command of the forward CP in Bizory. S-3 of the Battalion 
indomitable and experienced veteran of all preceding campaigns, Captain McKenna 
took over the hot spot swiftly and efficiently, and with the aid of Captain Raines, 
S-2, immediately tied in and stabilized the new line which extended from the 
road running north from Bizory around the town to the north, thence east 
connecting with TF Kennedy on the Bizory-Magaret road and about mid-way 
between the two towns. Task Force Davall also connected in the north and east 
with TF Wall. By observation during the day and by periodic patrols at night, 
the line was organized with the Assault Gun Platoon generally in _the sector 
bounded by the roads running north and northeast from Bizory. "B" Company 
tanks covered the eastern sector, exclusive of both roads with one section in 
support of the assault gun section in the center, and the others disposed to 
dominate the high ground from there east to the Magaret road. The TD pla-
toon with four destroyers was placed in support of the · line, with a section back-
ing up the center road. Also two 
infantry platoons and one engineer 
platoon occupied defensive positions 
in support of the tanks, while two 
infantry platoons remained in reserve 
in town. These were rotated with 
those on the line. There was no 
enemy activity during the night ex-
cept sporadic shelling of the road 
junction in Bizory ( now more aptly 
termed by the tankers "MISERY") . 
The 4th of January saw contin-
ued heavy shelling in Bizory which 
increased to extremely heavy concen-
trations about 1700; these concen-
trations consisted mostly of accurate 
artillery and mortar fire and inac-
curate nebelwerfer fire. Then be-
T j4 Mickey Rue with Little Nell 
the VII and the Battalion Insignia. 
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tween 2100 and 2200 enemy infantry made a series of short probing attacks, 
which were driven off by our braves without loss. 
At about 0300 the next morning, Jerry made a demonstration attack with 
tanks and infantry, and at 0530 they launched a determined attack with infantry 
and supported by SP's and tanks. They failed to penetrate our lines! The 
shelling continued all day long. Then we were assigned a platoon of cavalry 
reconnaissance which relieved the engineer platoon on the line, and the latter 
were held in town as reserve. Also Company "A" relieved Company "B" of 
its sub-sector, and they returned to Task Force reserve northeast of Bastogne. 
The strain was becoming terrific, the men were dog-tired, and faces became 
mask-like, without any feeling at all. While the above was occurring, Bastogne 
and the surrounding area was subjected to constant shelling by heavy guns, and 
the town was in a shambles. It will probably never be fully known how desperate 
our situation was becoming, and it can now be readily imagined what Von Rund-
stedt's forces could have done, had they been able to break through our position, 
for we were at the focal point of the whole deal. Had Jerry been able to take 
Bastogne, he would have secured a traffic artery with an excellent road network 
to all points. Then he would have shoved his push into high gear again, and 
there's no telling how far he could have gone, or how much time we would have 
lost. But he hadn't showed to us any signs of quitting, although all his futile 
buffetings against our stonewall defense had cost him dearly in manpower, 
equipment, and time. The sleepless tankers prepared for further attacks! 
January 6th brought with it continued shelling, and then at 0400 on the 
7th, Jerry launched an infantry attack along the axis of the trail running north-
east from Bizory. We held this off but pressure continued until daybreak. 
Then the attack slipped to the west and a few fanatical enemy entered the 
town itself. There was some sniper activity in town at about 0900, so our 
infantry and engineers screened through the town and cleaned them out. There 
was no let-up in the intermittent heinie artillery fire during the morning, rather 
it increased to extremely heavy concentrations in the afternoon, raking thoroughly 
the entire defensive positions. There was present continual tank and artillery 
pressure and reported contacts from dark to midnight. But the amazing men 
of the 68th held inexerably. 
Again on January 8th, the enemy made a coordinated tank-infantrv attack 
against our right flank and along the axis of the Bizory-Magaret road. -Six "A" 
Company tanks were knocked out like so many clay pigeons, and their fire 
couldn't effectively find Jerry in his positions along the draw; also the neighbor-
ing 69th's fire was long in coming, and ineffectual when it did. The enemy 
then swung the force of their attack against the hill south of the road and S0uth-
west of Magaret. Finally, however, before he could do more damage, Jerry was 
driven off again by our TD's and artillery fire. We reorganized our positions 
while the intermittent shellfire continued, and made preparations for an antici-
pated relief by the 320th Infantry Regiment. 
Then, at long last, at 1100 on the 9th, we were relieved of the sector by the 
3rd Bn. 320th; at the same time "C" Company was detached from TF Wall and 
to TF Hannon (320th) in support of an attack southeast of Marvie. The attack 
jumped off at 1000 and the objective was seized in the afternoon; the tankers 
remained there through the night in support of the foot-sloggers, while the re-
mainder of the battalion returned to billets in Bastogne. The kitchens were 
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brought up, and a good hot meal awaited the returning warriors, but most of 
them were so exhausted, so drained of every desire but endless sleep, that they 
skipped chow and went straight to sleep. 
The next day, elements of "D" Company relieved Charlie Company in support 
of the 35th Division task force, while the rest of the battalion took things easy. 
Then, on the ll th we moved to the rear to the town . of Hom pre for further rest 
and refitting. In spite of the excellent recovery and maintenance job that Captain 
Halloran's Battalion Maintenance men had done, we had suffered severe losses, 
and our total strength amounted to little better than a company of tanks. We 
needed refitting badly. On the following day, Company "D" was relieved from 
TF Hannon at 1500 and closed in the battalion area at 1700. At this point in the 
game, while the battle of the bulge raged fiercely, the tables were gradually being 
turned. Jerry was definitely stopped and our forces on both flanks were putting 
pincer pressure on the shrinking salient. 
We were relieved from CCA and attached to the 320th Infantry Regiment 
at 2100 on January 14th; Company "B" went to the 3rd battalion, Company "C" 
to the lst, and Companies "A" and "D" in reserve. Also, our Assault Guns were 
to support the 212th Field Artillery Battalion. All set to push the krauts back 
where they came from. We were to be used from now on as part of tank-infantry 
teams that were soon to make Von Rundstedt very sorry that he ever started this 
bulge business. The attack jumped off at noon, and the woods northeast of Bizory 
were screened through and cleared, · but then we bogged down on the face of 
heavy tank and automatic weapons fire from the smaller woods to the south-
west, so we called the affair to a halt and dug in for the night. 
So was the inauspicious beginning of the new phase in the battle of the bulge. 
The siege of Bastogne was, however, definitely over, and we recall that at that 
time there burst upon the world a flood of publicity, singling out for praise the 
crack lOlst Airborne Division and 
the 4th Armored Division. The two 
had done good jobs in the initial 
stages of the campaign, the former 
having stood fast in and around 
Bastogne before and just after Christ-
mas, and the latter having broken 
through to relieve them. But it was 
disillusioning and bitter for us, who 
had come in at the most crucial time 
and had borne the brunt of all that 
highly geared enemy pressure, had 
thrown back with heavy losses his 
every counter-attack, had without 
sleep or relief fought him tooth and 
nail until his terrific drive was slowed 
Capt. Rene Jacoby-A hard work-
ing supply officer who served in that 
capacity from the conception of the 
Battalion until he was killed at Bas-
togne, 9 January 1945 from Nebel-
werfer fire. 
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down to a standstill, to have so conspicuously ignored by the world our courag-
eous stand. We wondered with no little amazement if this were a war fought 
by PROs, and prepared for the next move. 
On the morning of January 15th, we called for and received an air strike 
on the small woods that had been so bothersome. Then after the welcome P-47s 
had worked it over thoroughly by bombing and strafing, the woods was attacked 
and cleared; this job being accomplished with methodical efficiency on the doughs 
part, and took them most of the day. On the following day, the task force jumped 
off at dawn, with the tanks initially in the rear, and cleared the area between the 
woods and Obourcy. When this was done, "C" Company swiftly moved directly 
in. This maneuver caught Jerry completely by surprise and the garrison was 
unable to escape; the remains of an enemy battalion, including the Charlie Oboe 
and his staff, were consequently mopped up and captured. The tide was turning! 
The seventeenth found us continuing the attack; Michamps was taken at 
1500 by elements of the 320th Infantry supported by Companies "B" and "C." 
Also, our Assault Gun Platoon went into position in the vicinity of Bizory and 
reinforced the fires of the 320th Cannon Company, while at the same time the 
Mortar Platoon moved into position near Obourcy in support of the 3rd Battalion, 
320th Infantry; on the eighteenth the 320th, with our support, held a defensive 
line along the main road running southeast from Bourcy, tied up some of the 
loose ends, and prepared to press the advance. 
The next day, Company "B," now refitted and reorganized, moved from the 
rear area in the vicinity of Hompre to Bastogne, and Lt. Colonel Sussman assumed 
command of the composite force at Michamps. Then, on the following day, 
elements of "A" Company relieved "C" Company which returned to Bastogne, 
while all along the line constant pressure was exerted, and our air support was 
very active, as it became more apparent that Jerry was pulling out and was throw-
ing up his hands at a bad job. 
On the 21st, we were relieved from our attachment to TF Byrnes (320th 
Infantry Regiment) and were attached to Task Force Miltenberger (l34th In-
fantry Regiment) , and on the next day Companies "A" and "D" supported the 
task force's attack on the woods east of Bourcy. At the same time, the Assault 
Gun and Mortar Platoons remained in position prepared to support the fires of 
the 212th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. It should be mentioned here, 
before going further, that we enjoyed working with the infantry. Our mutual 
cooperation was perfectly harmonious, and their commanders made careful con-
siderate use of our armor; we were not abused, and we were sensibly employed. 
The 23rd of January saw Companies "B" and "C" joining "A" and "D" in 
the. vicinity of Bourcy, and on this day we were assigned a novel mission, we 
didn't have to fight, but rather became temporarily a transport battalion, and 
chauffered the doughs on our tanks as far as Hofelt, Luxembourg. Then, when 
the move was accomplished, all companies reverted to battalion control at Hachi· 
ville. To clarify this transport business a bit, here is why it was necessary; the 
ground was snow-blanketed, and so made slogging on foot pretty tough for John 
Dough. Also Jerry was pulling out as fast as he could, and the infantry couldn't 
march fast enough dismounted to maintain contact. 
Again on the following day, we were called upon to transport Task Force 
Miltenberger to an assembly area three kilometers northeast of Hachiville. Then, 
Company "B" supported the 3rd Battalion and Company "C" in the consequent 
attack on Basbellen, where the enemy had decided to delay. It was hard work 
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for the doughs fighting across snow-covered fields, but the objective was secured 
by 1800; the remainder of the 68th stayed at Hachiville and Hofelt. On the 25th, 
Companies "B" and "C" reverted to battalion control and closed in the battalion 
area at 1145. 
All elements of the 68th were assigned the mission, on the 26th, of ferrying 
troops to task force Miltenberger to the vicinity of Hupperdange and Heiners-
cheid. "B" Company reconnoitered firing positions northeast of Heinerscheid, 
and closed in the town prepared to occupy the positions in the event of an enemy 
counter-attack. All other elements of the battalion, with the exception of Head-
quarters Company, closed in Hupperdance, and Headquarters Co. closed in biv-
ouac in the vicinity of Asselborn, with the Assault Gun Platoon in position pre-
pared to support artillery fires. The Battle of the Bulge was practically over, 
for we had driven Jerry right back to his original line of departure. We were 
now sitting just west of the German border, and could see from our positions 
along the Skyline Drive the famous Siegfried Line. The OUR RIVER lay be-
tween the krauts and us. 
The succeeding five days were luckily uneventful. The Germans entertained 
no thoughts of attacking; quite the contrary, they were content to hole up in the 
Siegfried Line .pillboxes, lobbed an occasional harrassing round over to our side, 
and sweated out our next move. We weren't going anywhere ourselves, for we 
had to pull in the reins, take stock of the situation, get "squared away," and pre-
pare to hurdle a dual barrier, one natural and the other formidably artificial-
the Our River and the Siegfried Line. 
On the last day of the month, Task Force Miltenberger was relieved of the 
sector by Task Force Brindle ( 86th Cavalry Recon Squadron, Mechanized-our 
division reconnaissance). "A" Company was attached to Task Force Brindle, 
but remained in its present position. So ended the month of January and the 
Battle of the Bulge! 
T j 5 James Giles, T j 5 (The ranking T j 5 
in the Division) Buff Lee, and T ) 5 George 
Farmer. These three are familiar to all mem-
bers of the battalion-the two peep drivers 
because you pr<?bably had to jump out of 
their way at one time or another, and Cpl. 
Lee because he was always prompt to say, 
"No mail today-it must be on a boat some-
where." 
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The most of the month of February was to prove relatively uneventful; the 
first three weeks or so were to witness methodical, then gradual accelerated prep-
arations for the ultimate assault of the big bugaboo we had heard so much about 
during our military careers, THE SIEGFRIED LINE. But, it was not only for the 
breaching of this heralded line of fortifications that we massed troops and materials; 
we intended, once through, to go all the way, and bring Hitler's teetering, punch-
drunk Germany to its knees with a series of merciless blows, and then finish it 
off with our specially trained Sunday Punch. That was inevitably to come. 
So, we probed and reconnoitered, shifted troops and supplies. Our part in 
this preparation wasn't very tactically active, for while we maintained our defen-
sive positions on Skyline Drive, there was a minimum of action. We supported. 
We carried on a program of rest, rehabilitation, and maintenance, and groomed 
ourselves for the ensuing action. Two vital bridges and bridgeheads across the 
Our River in our sector were secured and improved. 
Then, on the 17th, things began to cook. Company "B" (-) was attached 
to Task Force Brown; on the following day, one platoon of Company "A" and one 
platoon of Company "B" were attached to Task Force Brindle. Company "A" ( - ) 
and the Mortar Platoon were attached to Task Force Britton; the Assault Gun 
Platoon was attached to the 128th Field Artillery Battalion. Also, on the 19th, 
Company "C" was attached to Task Force Ward, and Task Force Davall, com-
posed of the remaining elements of CCB, formed and constituted CCB's Reserve. 
At dawn on the 20th, the above mentioned task forces of CCB jumped off 
and by darkness had secured their initial objective along Skyline Drive east of 
the Our River. On the following day, Company "D," part of Task Force Davall, 
moved across the river into a forward assembly area on the high ground north of 
Going through some 
of the fortifications of 
the Siegfried Line. 
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Dahnen (Germany!). The rest continued the attack north and south from the 
second and third objectives. We were through the LINE and were expanding 
our salient! The fighting was initially bitter, and the krauts refused to come 
.out of their reinforced pillboxes until they were blown out by engineer demolitions. 
But, in general our softening up prelude by both air and ground had been suc-
cessful, and we went pouring through. Task Force Britton had flanked Dasburg 
from the northeast, and Task Force Ward, subsequently committed, had swung 
northeast and then south to take Daleiden. There was barely a rock standing 
in these towns so devastating had been our air and artillery preparations. Now 
that we were through the line, and the enemy was threatened with our out-
flanking him in every position he chose to defend. Jerry was desperately trying 
to salvage what he had left, and to pull out, but fast, with every means he could 
lay his hands on. So we naturally wanted to close his escape gap, and for this 
mission a specially formed task force under Col. Davall was formed. Things 
were breaking so fast now that there was no longer time for studied, deliberate 
planning-only action hard and fast! 
So, on February 23rd, Task Force Davall was ordered to Reuler, and then 
immediately dispatched to Jucken. At Jucken a new special task force was formed, 
consisting of: The Reconnaissance Platoon, Companies "B" and "D," one platoon 
of Company "A," plus Troop "D" of the 86th Recon., Company "A" of the 44th 
AlB, one platoon of Company "A" 603rd TDs and two squads of Company "A" 
25th Armored Engineer Battalion. Our mission was to block the enemy routes 
of withdrawal along the axis Zweifelscheid-Leimbach-Kreuzdorf- Ackelshof-Ober-
geckler, and establishing contact with the 80th Infantry Division swinging up 
from the south to meet us. It was an end run play, with the accent placed on 
speed and surety. One platoon of Troop "D," reinforced with one squad of 
engineer mine sweepers, took off at 1640. Resistance was first encountered at Karls-
hausen, and this town was cleaned out with the co-operation of elements of the 
6th Cavalry Group which drove in from the southwest. By midnight, on a night 
that was pitch dark, Col. Davall's men had driven on and captured the towns 
of Finnehof, Wolperdorf, and Leimbach. Teller mines hastily strewed on the 
road and in the ditches were reported here by Lt. Burns, Reconnaissance Platoon 
Leader, and were immediately removed. The above mentioned towns were occupied 
1st Sgt. Granigan and 
Pfc. Aho of Service Co., 
Lts. Hughes of "Dog" 
and Burger of "Baker" 
Companies pose beside 
the famous sign which 
denoted our entry into 
Germany. 
-37-
by elements of Task Force Brown after our capture, and we pushed on. The task 
force then continued its drive to the south, clearing and capturing Hutten, Neu-
hutten, and Kreuzdorf. When road blocks were established on all approaches to 
Kreuzdorf at 0430, patrols from Troop "D" set out to contact the 80th Division: 
Finally, in the vicinity of hill 502 between Obergeckler and Kreuzdorf elements 
of the dough division were contacted; also we contacted friendly elements of the 
6th Cavalry Group on our right flank. 
We held what we had accomplished on the following day, and at 1200 one 
platoon of Company "A" 44th AlB occupied Neuerberg across the Enz River. 
When elements of the 6th Cavalry had relieved this dough platoon at Neuerberg, 
Task Force Davall was dissolved and all elements reverted to their parent units. 
So ended an extremely difficult, yet brilliantly directed and ably accomplished 
mission. The 68th Tank Battalion, once more intact, was released from CCB, 
attached to CCR, and returned to the general vicinity of Neuhutten. The various 
companies moved into billets, and settled down to a program of rest and maintenance. 
The remainder of the month of February was uneventfully passed, with occa-
sional bridge guard details, and so we rested and prepared for our next assignment. 
On the first of March, Companies "C" and "D" relieved Troops "E" and "F" 
of the 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron respectively. With the Assault 
Guns and Mortars in direct support, they continued the battalion's defensive mis-
sion in their assigned sector. By systematic patrols, contact with adjacent units 
was maintained. On the next day, in an incessant downpour, a tie-in point with 
the 4th Division at Watzerath was arranged, and the battalion continued its 
T /4 Red McCrory, ARC Girl, and Pfc. 
Charley Taylor-Two "Baker" Comp·any 
cooks taking time out from their chores, 
to entertain. 
defensive mission without change or 
mishap. The same is true of the 
succeeding day both of continued 
rains and also of active defense with-
out incident, and then on the 4th 
of March Companies "D" and "C" 
were relieved of their sector and 
returned to their former billets. The 
batallion remained in CCR. 
From the 5th to the 9th of April, 
the 68th's position was unchanged, 
and during this period there was 
initiated and followed a program of 
instruction in vehicular driving and 
maintenance; we had meanwhile 
gained a considerable number of re-
inforcements many of whom had 
never received armored instruction, 
and this was an excellent time to 
indoctrinate them into the technique 
of armored operation and necessary 
maintenance. Also, during this period 
the men had time to rest, catch up 
c,n correspondence, and see the latest 
moving pictures. 
Then, on the tenth of the month, 
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the battalion was ordered with the division to proceed to the vicinity of Dieuze, 
France. We crossed the IP at Karlshausen at 0710, and continued through 
Diekirch, Ettelbruck, Luxembourg, Thionville, and Pont-a-Moussen to the vicinity 
of Vi-Sur-Seille, Eezy, Juvelize, and Blanche Eglise. Although we remained in 
CCR, the division was now under 7th Army control. To clarify this a bit, 
the 7th Army on the south sector of the entire line had not been able to 
keep abreast of the 3rd in the north, were massing for their breakthrough of 
the Siegfried Line, and requested the "Super Sixth" to help them in their 
undertaking. So, the 4th Armored was given the beautiful set-up to break through 
on the north and dash unimpeded to the Rhine, while the ever dependable 6th 
was loaned out to the 7th to again break through this line near Zweibrucken 
Battalion Officers at the briefing preparatory to jumpoff into the heart of 
Germany. Battalion Guidons in rear. 
across the Saar. Tankers, what now! The entire division was marched to the 7th 
Army area. Out of Germany and back into the Saar again. We were going 
through the Siegfried Line again!! 
So, from the lOth to the 17th, we shifted our training locations a bit in the 
general area, and prepared assiduously for the task ahead. We tried out all our 
new 76mm. guns, and the men grew used to them; it was a good thing, because 
the new gun, with its muzzle brake, and greatly increased velocity, was fired with 
a stunning blast to those inside the tanks, and experience in handling the weapon 
was imperative. We continued to train recent replacements, and carried on our 
maintenance so that when the day arrived we were in the best possible shape. 
On March 17th, the battalion, still in CCR, received warning orders anticipating 
movement to a forward assembly area northeast of Sane-Union, and became Task 
Force Davall, composed of Companies "A" and "D," 68th Recon. Company, 
603rd TDs, one platoon of Company "C" 25th Engineers, and Company "A," 
50th AlB. On the 18th, Combat Team Davall marched with CCR to its forward 
assembly area. We beg your pardon, but such an aggregation of troops is called 
"Combat Team" in the Seventh Army! and closed in its new area at 1415. 
Just before noon on the 19th, we moved out to pass through two veteran 
infantry divisions which had been assaulting the Siegfried Line for the past several 
days. The column was hampered by poor road conditions, so its initial advance 
was slow, but we passed through Zweibrucken shortly after midnight; we had as 
yet met no opposition, for the doughs had pretty well erased the previously for-
midable line. Still hampered by poor traffic conditions and the delay of forces 
ahead of it on a poor road net, the combat team advanced slowly. Then, we started 
to shake loose, and shortly after noon on the 20th, we streaked rapidly to the 
vicinity of Gerardsbrunn against no organized oppositions; numerous elements of 
disorganized, highly confused enemy forces formed a continuous stream of apa-
thetically waved white flags along 
the column's axis of advance. Count-
less liberated slave laborers also 
choked the roads in a rear-ward trek. 
The Assault Gun Platoon fired on 
observed mission on a horse-drawn 
artillery column with excellent effect 
at co-ordinates (862835) . Then, Bat-
tery "A" of the 23lst Field Artillery 
Battallion joined us at Altheim. At 
1630, we assembled in the vicinity 
of Gerardsbrunn and awaited further 
orders. Subsequently, we received 
orders to proceed to Grundstadt, and 
moved out promptly. The bl'eak 
through had been complete and as 
we swept along we continuously con-
tacted friendly columns all racing 
to the Rhine. 
Cruising up the German Highways 
in full pursuit of the Krauts who left 
a few of their belongings behind. 
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Having marched all night, Combat Team Davall closed at Hettenleidheim at 
0500 on the 21st, where we bedded down for much rest. Then, refreshed again , 
we moved to a new area west of Grunstadt the following noon; Battery "A" 23lst 
was relieved from attachment here, and we settled down to rest and reorganize 
for future operations. 
We spent three days in our bivouac west of Grunstadt, until on the 25th we 
proceeded east and prepared to cross the Rhine. At 1730 the column continued 
east, crossed the river at Oppenheim, and thence made its way swiftly to the vicinity 
of Gross Gerau. The weather was ideal and we boiled along, virtually unopposed. 
At 1800, Lt. Col. Davall assumed command of CCR, and Major Daniel E. Smith 
assumed command of the combat team; Combat T earn Smith closed in bivouac 
at 2000, and on CCR order, Werfelden and Scheppenhausen were reconnoitered 
and found to be in friendly hands. 
On the next morning, the combat team instituted a road reconnaissance 
to the east in anticipation of a possible move in that direction; one platoon from 
Recon. Company 603rd TDs reconnoitered the route to the vicinity of Langen. 
Then at 1730 we left our bivouac area, and proceeded north to the vicinity of 
Gespitz where Col. Davall resumed command of the combat team. The following 
day, we remained there, and took many prisoners, as they willingly came in to 
surrender from isolated out-flanked positions. 
Company Commanders and Battalion Staff 
Left to Right-Lt. Paul A. Warp, Adjutant; Caf:t. Elzie Hickerson, Hdq. Co. Com-
mander; Lt. Col. H. C. Davall, Battalion Commander; Capt. William H. Collins, 
C Company Commander; Capt. Vincent P. Keville, Service Co. Commander; Capt. 
James R. Russell, B Company Commander. 
Standing-Capt. William Halloran, Bn. Motor Officer; Capt. Francis S. Morris, 
Communications Officer; Capt. Raymond W. Raines, Bn. S-2; Major Daniel E. Smith, 
Bn. Executive Officer; Major Robert B. McKenna, Bn. S-3; Capt. James E. Burns, Bn. 
Supply Officer; and Capt. John D. Rosin, Bn. Surgeon. 
Picture taken just before the jumpoff towards Zweibrucken, Kassel and the 
heart of Germany. 
Crossing the Rhine River. Baker Company's 
Pea Shooter under the command of Sgt. Orr. 
Next we proceeded from our biv-
uuac area and proceeded northeast 
to cross the Main River. Other ele-
ments of the division, unable to take 
the city by storm, and hampered by 
enemy shellfire which interrupted 
their attempts to secure a suitable 
bridgehead in Frankfurt, finally slid · 
off to the east to by-pass Frankfurt, 
and left the complicated, time necessary assault of Frankfurt to doughs, who had by 
this time come up to relieve us. After crossing the river under cover of smoke, the 
column roared to a temporary assembly area several miles east of the river and 
closed there at 2230. At 0700, on the 29th, · the combat team moved north through 
Nieden, Gross Karken, Assenheim, Berstadt, Griedel, and thence north on the 
autobahn ( super-highway) to an assembly area near Oppenrod. This was a light-
ning thrust, and sporadic small arms and bazooka fire were encountered and dealt 
with summarily. The combat team suffered, however, no casualties, and captured 
an estimated thousand prisoners, although there were doubtless many more which 
could not be accurately tabulated, so swift was the advance. We closed in our 
new area at 1700, and prepared for further operations to the east. 
Our drive was really under a full head of steam, and our opposition for the 
most part were not crack troops, but rear echelon commandos of the Wehrmacht. 
Surprising too, was the total lack of willingness to fight of the widely heralded 
Volksturm, old men and young boys, who, mutely bedraggled, lifted not a hand 
in resistance. In the vernacular, "They had had it!" .; ·1 
On the 30th, having lost Recon. Company 603rd TDs but having gained the 
274th FA Bn., we shoved off in a generally northeasterly direction through Geil-
hausen, Obergleen, \Vasenburg, Michelburg, Utterhausen, and Zennern, where 
we closed at 1020. This rapid thrust into the heart of Germany covered 66 miles; 
some small arms fire was encountered, but it was quickly disposed of. Then, im-
mediately on arrival at Zennern, Company "B" crossed the river to Ober Molrich 
in order to relieve cavalry elements already there. They underwent extremely 
heavy artillery fire while crossing. Later that night Company "C" reinforced 
Company "B," and also when combat team reconnaissance elements reached Wabern 
and Zennern, they received small arms and bazooka fire, as a result of which one 
attached tank destroyer was crippled, but the combat team subsequently inflicted 
heavy casualties on the enemy, and cleaned them out successfully. Then, too, 
during the night the Assault Gun Platoon fired missions to protect our bridgehead. 
One platoon of 603rd TDs was attached to the combat team, and we remained . 
under the control of CCA. · 
On March 31st, Company "B," led by Captain Russell, and one platoon of "A" 
Company 50th AlB attacked Werkel from the south during which attack they 
encountered heavy direct self-propelled and mortar fire; and were forced to with-
draw to the vicinity of Ober Molrich. Then, an air strike was requested, and 
P-47s consequently bombed and strafed the town. Next, Company "C" and a 
platoon of armored infantry attacked Werkel again, this time from the southwest, 
and lead elements succeeded in battering their way into town after a bitter fight. 
By midnight, Company "K" 26lst Infantry Regiment, meanwhile attached, secured 
the bridge at Werkel, and were further reinforced by elements of the combat team, 
which made preparations to move in. We remained in CCA. 
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The beginning of April found Combat T earn Davall continuing the attack, 
driving north to penetrate the defenses of Kassel. It is noteworthy that Colonel 
Davall's command was still the main driving, unchecked force in the division, 
as the other elements were probing and reconnoitering routes and possible river 
crossings to the east. Shortly after the jump off at 0820, lead elements ran into 
considerable small arms and self-propelled anti-tank fire at the outskirts of Gudens-
berg. However, this opposition was thoroughly dispersed and swiftly cleaned up, 
and the combat team went into a tightly tied-in assembly nearby. W e quickly 
organized the town, and waited there for further orders. Then, later in the day, 
we were relieved by the 3rd Batallion, 261st Infantry Regiment, and were alerted 
to be prepared to cross the Fulda River the next morning; the division commander 
had elected, since CCA could not find a suitable crossing of its own , to shove 
them across on a bridge farther south secured by CCB. 
So, on the following day, the column, refreshed by the maximum amount 
of rest under the circumstances, moved out to the south and in rapid succession 
passed through Zennern, Singlis, H ebel, and then swung east to cross the Fulda 
at Malsfeld; we continued in a north-easterly, then easterly direction, and reached 
Eschenstruth at 2010. Moderate resistance was encountered here, and also at 
Quentel and Furstenhagen, but it was cleaned out completely without loss; we 
h ad secured these towns by 2200, and prepared for further movement to the east. 
At 0700 on the 3rd, Task Force Davall continued its easterly advance, passi:qg 
through W albourg, and Wickerode. W e might mention here that other elements 
of CCA had continued advancing the preceding nigh t and this morning, under 
extremely fatiguing conditions, pitch darkness, rain, mud, and a tortuous, hilly 
route. However, this morning we negotiated the same distance in a fraction of 
their elapsed time, and also our men refreshed by a n ight's sleep and really ready 
to go. At 1445 we closed in the vicinitv of Hitzerode, in which general area the 
other elements of CCA h ad assembled. Reconnaissance elements were ordered 
to find a crossing over the W erra River, our next natural obstacle, and, in checking 
the bridge west of Bad Sooden , encountered a strongly defended road block, also, 
at 1430 heavy artillery and bazooka fire were received in that vicinity. So, with 
this knowledge, Colonel Davall organized a task force composed of one medium 
tank platoon, a light tank platoon , reconnaissance platoon , and Company "K" 
261st Infantry to reduce the block 
and secure the bridge at Bad Sooden . 
However, just as final co-ordination 
of the attack was being effected, 
the show was ordered stopped by 
higher headquarters; the task force 
was withdrawn, and during the with-
drawal further small arms, mortar, 
and self-propelled anti-tank fire was 
received although our supporting 
274th FA Bn. fired continuous pro-
tective barrages, and continued with 
interdictory fires. With the above 
accomplished, we prepared to move 
east again. 
Early on the morning of the 4th, 
we crossed the W erra River at a 
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T / 4 Herman Bumgartner, Lts. Jan non, 
Jones, Long, and Capt. Russel l on their way 
to look over the situation. 
point secured farther south than our former position, and swiftly bowled along to the 
vicinity of Struth, where we assembled in readiness for participation in the attack of 
Mulhausen. Then, as part of the general encirclement of the city before the division's 
attack, the task force moved to Lengefeld; Company "B," plus a platoon of FOX 
( Company "A" 50th AlB), was ordered to attack and secure Ammern, and this 
force accomplished its mission without loss by 2200, while capturing some thirty 
odd prisoners of war. Then with Lengefeld as a base, the combat team partici-
pated in the perimeter containing of Mulhausen while dough elements moved 
into the attack. 
In the afternoon of the next day, the city having been cleared, Task Force 
Davall moved into Mulhausen where it closed at 1800. Prior to this time, our 
attached platoon from the 603rd TDs was detached to CCA. We were then placed 
under CCR control and, while preparing for several days of necessary reorgani-
zation and refitting, were assigned the mission, in co-ordination with Task Force 
Ward, of defending the southeastern approach to Mulhausen. Also "A" Company 
50th AlB reverted to its parent battalion's control. 
So, we settled down to sit for a while, but, as it has happened on many previous 
occasions, this Jeriod of peace and quiet didn't last very long. For, later in the day 
we were alerte to prepare for an attack on the west in order to protect the division's 
rear and north flank. 
With its mission to secure the high ground northeast of Kalteneber and 
having once again attached to it "A" Company 50th AlB and detached from it 
"A" Company 68th, Task Force Davall proceeded to Dinglestadt on the morning 
of April 7th. We left a block there to protect our exposed north flank, and con-
tinued west to Kefferhausen, where advance elements encountered strong small 
arms and bazooka opposition. The combat team commander immediately deployed 
"D" (-), Commanded by Captain Raymond W. Raines, on the high ground north-
east of town, from which point they could support a frontal attack by "FOX" 
elements, which began attacking up the draw which leads into Kefferhausen. 
The Reconnaissance Platoon, having meanwhile lost one killed, one wounded, and 
one missing, withdrew to nearby cover. It soon became evident that the light 
Capt. William H . Collins 
During the lull in the advance, Doc 
Rosin, Doc Consroe, and Red MitcheiLengage 
in a fast game of cards. 
tanks couldn't adequately cover any further advance by our doughs, and the 
attacking platoon became pinned down by fire. Then, Colonel Davall ordered their 
withdrawal, effected with no little difficulty and exposure; having withdrawn, the 
foot-sloggers took up defensive positions south and east of town. Also, "B" and "C" 
Companies were deployed in firing positions south and east of town. We requested 
an air strike, and at I400 . the welcome P-47's bombed and strafed the podunk, 
during which assault one plane was shot down. In the meanwhile, Dinglestadt 
had been secured, and several hundred prisoners were taken. Then we withdrew 
into defensive positions around Dinglestadt, and infantry patrols went into the 
outskirts of Kefferhausen. We now had "B" Company 50th AlB, but had lost 
"C" Company, under Captain William H. Collins, to Task Force Ward, which 
had pushed parallel to and south of us to Wachstedt. Before midnight we had 
elements of Baker Company 50th in Kefferhausen, and a reinforcing battalion from 
the 76th Division had joined us in Dingelstadt, although their mission was to push 
farther northwest and further screen the division's north flank. In addition to losses 
suffered by our Recon. Platoon, "A" Company 50th lost several wounded and our 
"D" Company suffered three casualties during the day's operations, which was 
compensated in part by the heavy casualties which we inflicted on the enemy. 
On the following day, proceeding methodically through towns yet swiftly 
between them, the combat team proceeded from Dingelstadt through Flinsberg, 
and Kalteneber to Furstenhagen where it closed at I540. Scattered resistance was 
met, yet completely cleaned out; with our mission accomplished, we secured Fursten-
hagen where we awaited further orders, at the same time patrolling actively to the 
north, south, east, and west. During the latter part of the day we captured forty-
three more prisoners in the area. 
On the 9th, we continued our widespread patrols to contact elements of the 
3rd Cavalry Group, reported to be coming up from the southeast and east. Finally 
"A" of the 3rd Cavalry Reconnaisance Squadron and "B" of the 43rd Cavalry 
Reconnaissance Squadron were contacted. Also, we contacted elements of the 
69th Division. So, as their relief of us began, the combat prepared to return to 
Mulhausen. 
The following morning, we proceeded directly to Mulhausen, and all attachments 
were returned to their parent units. Maintenance and refitting were again begun, 
while the command anticipated further movement to the east and remained 
m CCR. 
On the II th, we took off again, 
as the entire division was on the 
move. Having again lost "A" 68th 
and gained "A" 50th Combat Team 
Davall made a fifty-three mile ad-
vance to Liebstedt. As part of the 
CCR column, we breezed through 
Hongeda, Dollstadt, Witerda, Klein-
rudstedt, and Hottlestedt to Liebstedt. 
There was considerable enemy activ-
ity over the column during the day, 
and our maintenance elements were 
bombed and strafed near Udestedt. 
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bite before shoving off again. Dead Krauts 
are something you can become used to. 
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beautiful 
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Smashing along, virtually unopposed, and gathering up .prisoners in the manner 
of a reaping machine, we pushed off again and proceeded south to Pfuhlsborn; 
thence we moved southwest to Gosserstadt where we joined the other elements 
of the division who were preparing to cross the Saale River at Gamburg. The 
column went into assembly there and awaited its turn to cross the bridge, remaining 
unusually widely dispersed, as the threat of enemy air was great. At 1310 we 
crossed the river and proceeded to Nauschutz. Just south of Goldschau, the Recon-
naissance Platoon and lead elements of "D" Company discovered a bridge prepared 
for demolition. Then after the attached engineer squad had disarmed the charges, 
the point encountered a defended road block. Lead elements immediately dis-
mounted, tanks were brought up, and under the personal direction of Lt. Col. 
Davall the opposition was quickly disposed of, and ten prisoners were taken. 
Having consequently screened through Goldschau, the task force went into assembly 
beyond town, awaiting further orders. At 1750 we moved out again to Meinweh, 
where a road block and small arms fire was encountered. "B" Companv im-
mediately by-passed the town, and barrelled down the main road to Doschwitz 
to clean it out and secure it. This proved no easy task, but by 2200, Captain 
Russell's men with only seven tanks, but meanwhile reinforced by "C" Company 
50th, had the burg well secured. Sporadic sniping from the outskirts continued. 
A patrol was organized, and set out by circuitous route to check on the condition 
of the underpass and river bridge just east of Zeitz. Both were reported intact, 
and in the meantime the lst Bn. 304th Infantry had joined and reinforced our 
force at Doschwitz. The infantry then began to make plans for a co-ordinated attack 
on the city the next morning, and during the remainder of the night considerable 
artillery and counter-battery fire was drawn by our supporting artillery. During 
this day's operations an estimated 150 prisoners were taken. 
On the 13th, Companies "A," "B," and "C" and the Assault Gun Platoon took 
up firing positions generally along the river bank southeast, west, and northwest 
of Zeitz, prepared to fire on definite targets in support of the attack by the foot-
slogging sad-sacks. "A" Company found the formerly O.K.ed bridge now K.O.ed, 
so the infantry assault was held up; 
Bringing the gas and supplies up in their 
trusty peep are S / Sgt. Robert Macomber and 
Lt. Jack Elder. 
suitable river crossings had first to 
be reconnoitered. Eventually the 
doughs forded the river at several 
points, and with the close support 
of the above mentioned companies 
moved into Zeitz. Prior to this, our 
Assault Gun Platoon suffered heavy 
shelling while refueling. Then, Com-
pany "B" and elements of Company 
"A" crossed the Weisse River at a 
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shallow point, and "B" company continued to closely support the infantry as they 
cleaned out the city. Heavy mortar, dual purpose ack-ack, and severe small arms fire 
was undergone during the expansion of our bridgehead here. Also all the while 
engineer attempts to improve the ford or construct a bridge were interrupted by 
heavy direct and indirect artillery fire. But, the afore-mentioned Baker tanks sup-
ported the doughs heroically in the cleanup of Zeitz; the remainder of the combat 
team left Grana, and crossed the Weisse farther downstream at Wetterzub. We 
picked up "B" Company here, and continued on, methodically and rapidly cleaning 
out Gleina (Where more Allied P.W.s were liberated, and several prisoners taken). 
Then in succession came Sabissa, Zipsendorf, the railroad bridge there secured, and 
Schleiditzrossitz. It should be noted here that after leaving Zeitz; the combat team's 
objective was extended farther east several times, so successful and rapid was its 
advance. 
Since the burgemeister had declared Altenburg an open city, the combat team 
contained and guarded several important installations and materiel warehouses 
until relieved by following infantry. Then, at noon, we moved east again, and 
in quick succession passed through Windischleuba, Dolsenhain, Landau, Corba 
(at this point we had a bridge across the Mulde River blown in our face). We 
quickly found another bridge several kilometers south and crossed in the vicinity 
of Cossen. At 1730, the column, now pointed by "B" Company passed throu.gh 
Koenigshain, and Mittweida, and thence to Erlau , where they closed at 1810. 
Patrols were set up, and so contact with nearby units was maintained. 
This point is the farthest east that the combat team as a whole had penetrated 
into the Reich. As a matter of fact, our task force had marched some sixty to a 
hundred kilometers beyond the occupational zone boundaries assigned to . the 
U.S.A. at the Yalta Conference. We were way out in front; Germany had been 
split wide open, and was bursting at the seams. This point in time as well as 
distance also marks the virtual termination of combat in the ETO for the 68th 
Tank Battalion. Of course, we know that V-E Day was not declared until several 
weeks later, but for all intents and practical purposes we were through fighting. 
We were not sure of this, however, for the action still went on north and south 
of us. We were way out there, and so we waited and waited until the Russians 
joined us. We maintained law and order, and moved from billet to billet, never 
very far, or for very long. Then, at last the big boys made it official, and on 
May 12th we were told it was all over, that hostilities had ceased, and the Germans 
had surrendered unconditionally. Strangely enough, this announcement brought no 
wild demonstrations of joy. Rather, we were glad it was over, were secretly proud 
of the part v<4e had played in this final victory and all that succeeded it, were sorry 
that our fallen comrades could not be there in Eschfeld with us on that day. 
FINISH 
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MjSgt. Elijah Shivers and WOJG Berry 
W. Russell out looking for parts to repair our 
vehicles. They usually found them too. 
Notes from the Adjutant 
As Adjutant of the 68th Tank 
Battalion from 19 September 194 3 
until 22 May 1945, it was my pleas-
ure to lwow and work with many 
of you. In appreciation of those 
pleasant associations I want to share 
with you this history, facts, figures, 
and pictures, which will in a small 
way show our efforts in winning 
World War II. 
In order that every member of 
the Battalion receives his copy, it 
will he necessary for each of you 
to fill out the enclosed card giving 
name and present address of as many 
of the men as you know. Kindly 
do this and return the card to me. 
The best of luck to you and yours. 
Sincerely, 
PERTINENT STATISTICS TO THE BATTALION 
These facts and figures may give you an insight on the magnitude of our 
operations as a division and a battalion. In casualties, the Division had 110 officers 
killed and we had 9, the Division 1172 enlisted men killed and we had 75, 
wounded the figures ran 294 officers and 4,086 enlisted men for the Division 
and we had 27 officers and 185 enlisted men. Of the 52 people missing in action 
in the Division, we had one. In non-battle casualties the division had 272 officers 
and 4,885 enlisted men and we had 12 and 260. As a matter of comparison, our 
casualties were lower than either of the other two tank battalions. 187 personnel 
returned to duty from casualty status and 373 replacements joined the battalion 
during combat. 
We had six battlefield appointments-1st Lt. Harry Burger, lst Lt. ernard 
Brock-Jones, 2nd Lt. Millard Watson, 2nd Lt. John Dahl, 2nd Lt. Everett 
Tourjee, and 2nd Lt. \iValdo Shumway. All but Shumway served within the 
battalion after being commissioned. 
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The division awarded the following medals: 
Distinguished 
Service Cross 
15 
We had- 2 
Silver Star 
1457 
97 
Bronze Star 
5221 
327 
Purple H eart 
1633 
126 
Soldiers Medal 
31 
2 
The Distinguished Service Crosses went to 1st Lt. Vernon L. Edwards of Baker 
company posthumously for his work on the Han Sur Neid River Crossing, and 
Major Daniel E. Smith for his actions at Landroff, France. The soldiers medals 
went to T I 4 Harold Stanisch of Maintenance for his quick thinking in throwing 
can of gasoline and thereby saving lives and equipment. T / 5 George Farmer of 
Headquarters for his aggressive action at Dinglestadt, Germany in extricating a 
dead pilot of a P47 which had crashed nearby, even though the plane was burning. 
The percentage of personnel who were still in the division on VE day and 
sailed from the States with us- Division 60% of Officers and WOs, 54% of NCOs 
of 1st 3 grades, and 66 % of Enlisted men less the 1st 3 grades and in the 
battalion we had 48 % of the Officers and Warrant Officers, 60% of the NCOs 
of the 1st three grades and 66% of the Enlisted men less the 1st 3 grades. ( Per-
sonally, I feel these figures a little high, but have no records to back up my 
thoughts.) The division sent 5,500,000 letters and received 7,500,000 letters and 
we sent 375,000 parcels and received 425,000 parcels. In Money Orders, the division 
sent home $1,351,220.77. 28% of total earned pay was sent home by Money Order, 
Personal Transfer Account, and other means after it had first been drawn in cash 
from the division finance officer. Only about 10% of the pay was retained by the troops. 
The Provost Marshal processed 61,864 prisoners of war and the biggest batch 
came through during the period 9 March thru 8 May when 48,433 looked at the 
6th Armored Patch and knew the jig was up. Four of the ten chaplains who started 
the campaign with us did not finish, one was killed, and three evacuated. The di-
vision had 847 Sunday Services with a total attendance of 53,590 and 813 week-
day services with an attendance of 38,321. 57 Jewish services were held with atten-
dance of 819. 38,171 received Holy Communion and 21,409 confessions were heard. 
The 68th received 80 new light and medium tanks to replace worn out and 
knocked out equipment. 17 peeps and 10 6x6's were also replaced. As for 
shooting we used 1,837,750 rounds of 30 cal. MG.; 60,700 carbine; 63,172 rifle; 
233,400 45 cal. ball; 2760 37mm.; 2439 81mm. Mortar; 16,155 75mm.; 6,408 
rounds 76mm.; and 10,844 rounds of 105 mm. howitzer. (This can be explained 
by the action of "Battery Hickerson" who fired twice as many rounds as one tank 
battalion and 1300 rounds more than the other tank battalion. Those artillerymen 
who watched this battery fire, all agreed that it was doing top notch shooting.) 
\Ve used 3,658 grenades, and 144,435 rounds of cal. 50. 
Maps-the division used 144,435 sheets which weighed 21.4 tons. 
Trucks-division trucking companies traveled far enough to go 37 1h times around 
the world merely to bring supplies to the supply dump located in the division area. 
4,211 ,074 rations (1 ration equals 3 meals for one man) were drawn in the 
nine month period. 19,769 pairs of socks were issued. 11 ,47 1 field jackets, 
22,037 shirts, 18,032 trousers, 13,642 overcoats, 13,272 overshoes, and 73,821 
underwear. 5,479,770 gallons of 80 octane gasoline were used. This amounts to 
a sizeable pile of supplies, even for a division. 
The · division evacuated 1,289 American dead and 800 german dead. Ceme-
teries in which division dead are buried are: St. Mere Eglise, Blonville, St. 
James, Chalons, Andilly, Limey, Grand Failly, and St. Avoid, France; Fay, Bel-
gium; Hamm, Luxembourg; Stromberg, Butzbach, Eisenach, and Brenau, Germany. 
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Battalion Commander 
Executive Officer 
Adjutant 
S2 
S3 
S 3 Air 
S4 
S5 
Liaison 
Commanding 
Motor Officer 
Reconnaissance 
Mortar 
Assault 
Commanding 
Motor Officer 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Commanding 
Motor Officer 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Commanding 
Motor Officer 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Commanding 
Motor Officer 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Platoon Leader 
Commanding 
Motor Officer 
Transport Officer 
Supply WO 
Auto WO 
Personnel 
Surgeon 
Assistant 
BATTALION OFFICERS 
July 23 May 8 
Lt. Col. Davall 
Major Brown 
Lt. Warp 
Capt. Raines 
Major Britton 
Ca.pt. Parker 
Capt. Jacoby 
Capt. Klotz 
Lt. Burns 
Same 
Major Smith 
Same 
Lt. Burns 
Major McKenna 
Capt. Morris 
Capt. Burns 
Capt. Halloran 
Lt. Sillins 
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 
Capt. Brown 
Lt. Mohr 
Lt. Linebaugh 
Lt. England 
Lt. Hickerson 
ABLE COMPANY 
Capt. Polk 
Lt. George 
Lt. Zimmer 
Lt. Hafley 
Lt. Kratzer 
BAKER COMPANY 
Capt. Blaud 
Lt. Edwards 
Lt. Russell 
CHARLIE COMPANY 
Capt. Smith 
Lt. Schor 
Lt. Hoffmann 
Lt. Lundh 
Lt. Elliott 
DOG COMPANY 
Capt. McKenna 
Lt. Halloran 
Lt. Siedentop 
Lt. Lequire 
Lt. Collins 
SERVICE COMPANY 
Capt. Burns 
Lt. Keville 
Lt. Elder 
WOJG Morse 
WOJG Russell 
CWO Exner 
MEDICS 
Capt. Schlossman 
Lt. Callister 
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Capt. Hickerson 
Same 
Same 
Lt. Glenn 
Lt. Clapp 
Ca-pt. Parker 
Lt. Hogan 
Lt. Brock-Jones 
Lt. Houston 
Lt. Pavlich 
Capt. Russell 
Lt. Jannon 
Lt. Long 
Lt. Jones 
Lt. Hughey 
Capt. Collins 
Lt. Metzger 
Lt. Lundy 
Lt. Farris 
Lt. Dahl 
Capt. Raines 
Lt. Larsen 
Lt. Allen 
Lt. Ketchum 
Lt. Hughes 
Capt. Keville 
Lt. Bierer 
Same 
Same 
Same 
Same 
Capt. Rosin 
Lt. Consroe 
Sgt. Major 
Intell ig·ence 
Operations 
Supp ly 
1st Sergeant 
Reconnaissance 
Mortar 
Assault 
Motor Sergeant 
1st Sergeant 
Motor Sergeant 
P latoon Sergeant 
P latoon Sergeant 
P latoon Sergeant 
1st Sergeant 
Motor Sergeant 
Platoon Sergeant 
P latoon Sergeant 
Platoon Sergeant 
1st Sergeant 
Motor Sergeant 
P latoon Sergeant 
P latoon Sergeant 
Platoon Sergeant 
1st Sergeant 
Motor Sergeant 
Platoon Sergeant 
Platoon Sergeant 
Platoon Sergeant 
1st Sergeant 
Motor Sergeant 
Transport 
Maintenance 
Personnel 
The f irst g roup of 
68th men to leave for 
home-Pvt. Bell , " Char-
I ie" ; T 14 Stratton, 
" Dog"; T I Sgt. Barry, 
"Medics"; T 14 Stanish , 
" Maint'' ; 1st Sgt. Knott, 
" Bn. Hq." . 
Back Row-1st Sgt. 
Bradford , " Dog" ; 
Green , "Baker" ; 
Pfc. Herbert, "Bn . 
-all these men 
over 100 po ints. 
Sgt. 
and 
Hq." 
had 
BATTALION NCO's 
HEADQUARTERS 
July 23 
None 
SISgt. 
TISgt. 
TISgt. 
Lander 
Etheridge 
Sunderland 
May 8 
MISgt. Knott 
T I Sgt. Uszner 
Sgt. Petrillo 
Sgt. Nudelman 
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 
1st Sgt. Chinn 
SISgt. Helton 
SISgt. HaiJley 
SISgt. Kretchmer 
SISgt. Brown 
ABLE COMPANY 
1st Sgt. Watson 
T I Sgt. Bement 
SISgt. Brock-Jones 
SISgt. Burger 
SISgt. Shumway 
BAKER COMPANY 
1st Sgt. Doyle 
T I Sgt. Del Moro 
SISgt. Rewucki 
SISgt. Mackay 
SISgt Tourjee 
CHARLIE COMPANY 
1st Sgt. Dahl 
T 1 Sgt. Harper 
SISgt. Mays 
SISgt. Reece 
SISgt. Crumb 
DOG COMPANY 
1st Sgt. Degnan 
T I Sgt. Ebert 
S I Sgt. Shevlin 
SISgt. Sutton 
SISgt. Karpinski 
SERVICE COMPANY 
1st Sgt. Knott 
S I Sgt. Templeton 
SISgt. Macomber 
T 1 Sgt. Shore 
T I Sgt. Hogan 
Same 
Same 
Same 
S I Sgt. Haefmeyer 
Same 
1st Sgt. Foutch 
Same 
SISgt. D'Orazio 
S I Sgt. Sucharski 
S I Sgt. Yadlowski 
1st Sgt. Carter 
Same 
Same 
Same 
S I Sgt. Esposito 
SISgt. Poppe 
Same 
SjSgt. Hicks 
SISgt. Haun 
1st Sgt. Goldstein 
Same 
SjSgt. Porter 
SISgt. Colas 
S j Sgt. Torrance 
1st Sgt. Granigan 
Same 
Same 
Same 
Same 
1st Sgt. Archie Carter, Cpl. George Shep-
pard, and T /4 Herman Bumgartner. Three 
well-known "Baker" Company men. 
S / Sgt. Luther Brown, Hq. Co.; Cpl. Del 
Cogliano, A Co.; T / Sgt. Paul Harper, C Co.; 
Lt. Millard F. Watson, B Co.; and T / 4 Fr'!._ k 
Falls, C Co. 
The Company Runners-Holding an important job which 
was performed in a very creditable manner-Left to Right: 
"Baker's" Weil, "Charlies" Taubenberger," "Abies" Bratcher, 
"Medics" Schlessinger, "Maintenances" Barker, "Dogs" Dankel, 
and "Hqs." Macchiarola. 
trouble Major 
Four braves from "Baker"-Sgt. Zaun· 
brecher, S j Sgt. Mackey, T / 4 Hagermann and 
Cpl. Fuller. 

